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I. INTRODUCTION
The American legal system is responding to the challenges pre-
sented by corporate enterprises of unprecedented size and complexity by
increasingly adopting enterprise principles to overcome the inadequacies
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of traditional jurisprudential concepts fashioned centuries ago. This is a
change of profound significance in American law, not only in the fed-
eral system, but in the law of the fifty American states as well.
Because of the global nature of the world economy, the application
of enterprise principles to foreign subsidiaries of American parent cor-
porations is of great importance to the international community as well.
Multinational corporate groups increasingly have become predominant in
the world economy.' The application of American law to multinational
groups, with their many foreign subsidiaries and affiliates, although
inevitable in order to fulfill domestic regulatory imperatives, makes for
serious international confrontation when national policies conflict. The
application of national law and enterprise concepts to world business
thus constitutes a major challenge to the international legal order.
In the United States, as in other Western countries, traditional cor-
poration law has had misty medieval roots that reflect principles derived
from Roman law. For centuries, English law (which was adopted by the
United States after the Revolution) has viewed each corporation as a
separate juridical entity with its own rights and responsibilities, separate
and distinct from those of its shareholders. This view of the corporation
as a separate juridical entity with its own rights and duties distinct from
those of its shareholders is entity law. Much more recently, the centu-
ries-old view of the corporation as a separate legal personality was
reinforced by the adoption, after major political struggles, of the sepa-
rate doctrine of limited liability of shareholders for corporate debts.
This did not occur decisively in the United States until 1830, when the
doctrine was adopted by Massachusetts, 2 (then the leading industrial
state) or until 1855 in England.3
Until the end of the nineteenth century, a corporation could not
hold shares in another corporation except where expressly authorized by
statute. Such authorization was rare except in the case of railroads and
telegraph companies, and unheard of for manufacturing corporations.
Corporate groups and holding companies were unknown.4
1. Intra-enterprise transactions of multinational corporations represent approximately 30 to 40
percent of American exports. Transactions with others account for much of the remainder. See
S. Hipple, The Changing Role of Multinational Corporations and K.C. Casson & R.D. Pearce,
Intra-firm Trade and the Developing Countries in U.S. International Trade in 8 UNITED NA-
TIONS LIBRARY ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE AND PAYmNTS) 99, 114-23, 137, 145 (Fl. Gray ed. 1995).
2. 1830 Mass. Acts 325, 329, Act of Feb. 23, 1830 ch. 53, § 8.
3. Limited Liability Act, 1855, 18 & 19 VicL, ch. 133 (1855); Joint Stock Companies Act,
1856, 19 & 20 Vict., ch. 47 (1856).
4. Phillip L Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L 573, 605
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This all changed with the revolution of state corporation law led by
New Jersey in the 1890s. For the first time, the acquisition and forma-
tion of subsidiaries was freely permitted. Within a decade, corporate
groups began to dominate the American economy.
For almost half a century thereafter, American corporate and regula-
tory law did not recognize the existence of corporate groups, even
though they included the major enterprises in the American economy.
Commencing in 1933 with the New Deal Reform Era of the first
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, the American legal system dra-
matically changed, particularly on the statutory level, as the utilization
of enterprise principles replaced traditional entity law.
This change was the result of an effort to deal effectively with the
problems presented by corporate groups. Legislative action, administra-
tive implementation, and judicial decision-making have all participated
in the increasing acceptance of enterprise concepts. With dozens of
statutes and hundreds of judicial opinions, the present author (no doubt
an excessively wordy author) has required 15 years, six volumes, and
approximately five thousand pages to describe and analyze adequately
the attribution by American law of intra-enterprise rights and liabilities
among parent, subsidiary, and sister subsidiary companies.'
This movement from entity law to enterprise principles has occurred
to varying extent and through different techniques in different areas of
the American law. Any review of the development of the American law
of corporate groups may proceed effectively only by rigorously separat-
ing each of these jurisprudential areas from the others.
In the area of statutes of specific application expressly referring to
corporate groups, the legislature has adopted enterprise principles, typi-
cally building on the concepts of the "controlled" corporation and the
holding company.' Elsewhere, in the statutes of general application
(1986). See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 556 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The holding company was impossible.").
5. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURE (1983) [here-
inafter LCG-I], BANKRUPTCY (1985) [LCG-II], SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW (1987) [LCG-III],
STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION (1989) [LCG-IV], STATUTORY LAW OF SPECIFIC
APPLICATION (1992) [LCG-V], and STATE STATUTORY LAW (1995) [LCG-VI]. See also PHILLIP
I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A
NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993); Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate
Groups, II J. CORP. L. 573 (1986).
6. As discussed below, the concept of "control" underlies much of statutory enterprise law.
This is typically defined functionally as the "power [however obtained] to command or direct
the command of the management or policies of a corporation." See Bank Holding Company
Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841. Many statutes focus pervasively on the parent corporation with such
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lacking any such express adoption of enterprise law, in the substantive
common law of contracts, torts, and property, in judicial procedure, and
corporate procedure, the law develops as the judiciary determines.
The great range of jurisprudential concept and outcome in consider-
ing the intra-enterprise attribution of rights and obligations among the
members of a corporate group in various areas of the law is not only
inevitable but appropriate. It flows from the understanding that the en-
terprise concepts underlying the law of corporate groups rest on essen-
tially pragmatic considerations rather than on any transcendental legal
concept. Intra-enterprise attribution of rights or liabilities among the
constituent companies of the group does not flow from the legal accep-
tance of an overriding concept of the group as an economic entity. Nor
does such attribution derive from substituting this concept for the tradi-
tional jurisprudential concept of each corporation as a separate juridical
entity with its own rights and liabilities. As opposed to a doctrine of
universal application such as the entity law, which it supersedes on oc-
casion, intra-enterprise attribution occurs only where the statute so pro-
vides or where, under the particular facts of the controversy before the
court, the court concludes that the application of enterprise, rather than
entity, concepts better implements the underlying policies and objectives
of the law in the area.
In the statutory law, each regulatory program has its own jurispru-
dential world framed by the statutory text, the statutory history, the
history of the socio-economic problem giving rise to the enactment, the
policies and objectives underlying the act, and the administrative gloss.
Antitrust is very different from environmental law; banking has different
needs than meatpacking. In private controversies at common law, sub-
stantive issues present concerns different from procedural questions, and
within the substantive law, contract, tort, and property have dramatically
different objectives. Similarly, within procedure, such issues as jurisdic-
tion, joinder, res judicata, and the statute of limitations have varying
objectives and present their own very special problems.
These underlying differences in subject matter inevitably result in
different levels of application of enterprise principles. While the law of
corporate groups has pervasive themes of considerable prominence, it
varies dramatically in usefulness and acceptance from area to area.
Where it does occur in American judge-made law, intra-enterprise attri-
"control" often called a "holding company" and extend the statutory program to all its con-
trolled corporations. Others utilize the concept selectively and utilize enterprise concepts only in
designated areas.
1996]
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bution of rights and responsibilities among the constituent companies of
corporate groups rests on a common foundation, but with significant
variations, reflecting the aspect of the legal system involved. It is the
product of an uneven and episodic evolution that first and foremost
rests on pragmatic responses to specific policies and problems, rather
than on transcendental jurisprudential foundations.
This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of those
areas of American law in which enterprise principles have superseded
traditional entity concepts of corporate law. These are areas in which
the legislature or the courts have concluded that enterprise principles,
rather than entity law, more effectively carry out the underlying policies
and objectives of the law.
II. AMERICAN JURISPRUDENTIAL STANDARDS FOR INTRA-ENTERPRISE
ATTRIBUTION
The American law of corporate groups rests on a series of very
different statutory and common-law standards:
*the concept of "control" in many statutory areas consisting of a
numerical standard buttressed by an alternative functional standard of
the power to direct or influence the direction of corporate affairs;
*numerical standards of stock ownership in statutory areas, such as
tax, requiring a high degree of clarity and ease of application;
*the standard of "integrated enterprise" in statutes dealing with la-
bor relations, employment, and discrimination;
*the "unitary business" standard in testing the constitutionality of
state unitary tax apportionment statutes for taxation of interstate and
multinational corporate groups;
*the traditional and modified concepts of "piercing the veil" in ju-
dicial decisions in common law areas and in the application of statutes
of general application; and, finally,
*those state judicial decisions that uphold the intra-enterprise attri-
bution of rights and responsibilities avowedly in reliance on enterprise
principles, such as decisions in Louisiana resting on the "single enter-
prise" standard.7
In the statutory world, the concept of "control" plays a decisive role
in determining the applicability of enterprise principles. Judicial invoca-
7. See infra notes 143-45.
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tion of enterprise rests on a broader foundation. While courts that have
superseded entity doctrines with enterprise principles have relied primar-
ily on the concept of "control," they have adopted an enterprise ap-
proach only when "control" is accompanied by certain other critical
factors. These include the following:
*the economic integration of the enterprise collectively being con-
ducted by the dominant parent and subservient subsidiaries under the
parent's "control";
*the financial interdependence of the members of the group with
the use of the funds or credit of the parent or one group member for
the benefit of other group members;
*the administrative interdependence of the members of the group
with the parent or a subsidiary providing common group services to all
members, including such services as legal, accounting, engineering,
public relations, payroll, personnel, safety, and research and develop-
ment;
*group utilization of personnel and personnel services with common
group pension, medical, insurance, and profit-sharing plans together
with personnel moving from one member company to another without
loss of group seniority; and
*the conduct of the business of the group by the constituent compa-
nies under the common public persona of the group, including the same
tradename, trademark, logo, advertising slogans, forms, and color
schemes.
With this summary background as a framework for discussion, the
paper proceeds to review the evolution of these doctrines in recent
years.
A. The Supreme Court Decisions Employing Enterprise Principles
Fifty years ago, a badly divided Supreme Court adopted enterprise
principles in Anderson v. Abbott8 in the construction of a banking stat-
ute that imposed double assessment liability on the shareholders of in-
solvent national banks. In Anderson, the Court imposed the statutory
obligation on the shareholders of a bank holding company that held all
the shares of the insolvent bank subsidiaries even though the statute did
not apply literally since the holding company shareholders were not
directly shareholders of the subsidiaries. The Court emphasized that
8. 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
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"realities not forms" should govern and that "[t]o allow this holding
company device to succeed would be to put the policy of double lia-
bility at the mercy of corporate finance."9
In the last decade and one half, the Supreme Court has had to re-
solve, in a series of major cases, controversies presenting a fundamental
jurisprudential choice between enterprise law and traditional corporate
entity law. Enterprise law would determine the legal rights and obliga-
tions of the parties by focusing on the corporate group as a unit and
traditional corporate entity law by treating the various constituent cor-
porations as separate juridical entities, each with its separate rights and
obligations.
In each of these cases, the Court embraced enterprise principles
firmly in order to implement the underlying objectives of the law in the
area and rejected application of the traditional corporate doctrines.
These landmark decisions are the Copperweld ° decision (1984) in an-
titrust law; the Unitary Tax cases (1980 to 1994) in constitutional
law; and the Cuban Trade Bank12 case (1983) involving the applica-
tion of the set-off of a claim against the Cuban government against a
claim being asserted by a controlled Cuban governmental instrumentali-
ty. In some of these cases, the Court accompanied its rejection of entity
law by pointing out the lack of utility of "piercing the veil jurispru-
9. Anderson, 321 U.S. at 363.
10. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
11. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994); Allied-Signal, Inc. v.
Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. 159, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 909 (1983); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S.
354 (1982); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
12. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623
(1983).
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dence" in contributing a solution to the jurisprudential problems in-
VolVed.1
3
B. Statutory Regulatory Law of Specific Application To Corporate
Groups
1. Introduction of Enterprise Principles
American statutes of specific application to corporate groups that
use enterprise principles substantially now include the great federal stat-
utes regulating the banking industry, the savings and loan industry, se-
curities, investment companies, employer-sponsored pensions, export
controls and foreign trade, among others. Enterprise concepts play an
important, although less pervasive, role in the federal labor relations,
employment, and anti-discrimination statutes as well.
The acceptance of enterprise law in statutes of specific application
includes aspects of state jurisprudence as well. State regulatory statutes
governing insurance, casino gambling, and alcoholic beverages in addi-
tion to state banking and savings and loan institution law are the most
prominent examples of this development in state law.
The high water of American adoption of enterprise principles is
found in the many federal and state statutes that apply enterprise princi-
ples, resting directly or indirectly on doctrines of "control," to the regu-
lation and taxation of corporate groups and the corporations that com-
prise them.
This development got underway as one of the major reforms intro-
duced by the New Deal Era of American history during the first ad-
ministration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The legal concepts em-
ployed have not only had a profound impact on American jurispru-
dence, but have served as jurisprudential models for developed nations
around the world.
Prior to the Roosevelt era, American law had been wedded exclu-
sively to entity law and its concept of the corporation as an indepen-
dent juridical entity with its own separate rights and liabilities. Against
this legal structure, reinforced by concepts of limited liability and the
highly formalistic and conceptual application of law characteristic of the
13. In the Cuban Trade Bank case, for example, Justice O'Connor rejected counsel's analysis
utilizing such terms as "whether to pierce the corporate veil" or "alter ego" or "instrumentality"
and, relying on Justice Cardozo, "warned ... against permitting worn epithets to substitute for
rigorous analysis." Fst Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba. 462
U.S. at 623.
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American judiciary and academy of the time, previous federal industrial
regulation (particularly of the railroad industry, its principal target) had
been largely an exercise in futility. Corporate counsel readily evaded
statutory and administrative objectives by manipulating corporate forms
and interposing subsidiaries to insulate the regulated parent company
from a proscribed activity. These achievements resulted in widespread
evasion of statutory objectives.14
a. The Emergence of "Control" as the Linchpin of Statutory
Enterprise Liability
Such governmental impotence changed dramatically with the enact-
ment, from 1933 to 1935, of a series of major regulatory statutory pro-
grams based on enterprise principles: the Securities Act of 1933,'5 the
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933,16 the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,"7 and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935.18 In the statutes and in administrative rule-making implementing
them, the coverage of the statutes was expanded substantially by includ-
ing under the regulatory program not only the parties performing the
activities in issue, but all other persons linked to them by "control."
The statutes imposed liability not only on the parties directly participat-
ing in the proscribed or regulated activity, but also on the party or par-
ties that "controlled" them. 9 Parent corporations, however carefully
shielded from participation in the regulated activity, became liable along
with the subsidiary that actually committed the violation.
This expanded liability was accomplished through a series of alter-
native standards for "control." Under the reform statutes, this essential
element for expansion of the outer boundaries of statutory liability
could be established in a number of ways. For example, a specified
proportion of voting stock ownership could suffice. Further, effectively
preventing evasion by structural manipulation, the statutes or adminis-
trative gloss added an alternative functional standard: "control" also
14. See United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 298 U.S. 492 (1936); United States v. Delaware
& Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909). See also Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371
U.S. 115, 124 (1962). See also BLUMBERG, LCG-IV, supra note 6, at ch. 19.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1988).
16. 48 Stat. 211 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1988).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a et seq. (1988).
19. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(3), 77o; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 781(b)(1), 78m(b)(1), 78m(e)(2), 78t; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15
U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7)-(8) (1988).
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could be established by the "possession direct or indirect of the power
to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a
person whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract,
or otherwise. ' '20
In the Public Utility Holding Company Act and a number of later
statutes including the Investment Company Act, the Bank Holding
Company Act, and the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act,
among others, this functional standard was expanded further. The stat-
utes modified "control" to include a party with a "controlling" influence
over the regulated company. In addition, administrative regulations
reduced the percentage of stock giving rise to a presumption of control
when coupled with certain other indicia of interrelationship.2'
Application of the concept of "control" as the standard establishing
the outer boundaries of the legislative program has, in numerous stat-
utes, expanded even further, reaching beyond parent corporations to
include all members of the controlled group, parents, subsidiaries, and
sister subsidiaries. This was accomplished by a provision expanding the
scope of statutes to include not only the regulated party but all others
"that it controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with."
This expanded concept of "control" has become a hallmark of most
American regulatory law.
Although some regulatory statutes, particularly state statutes, still
naively use majority stock ownership as the sole numerical standard for
determining "control," the great regulatory statutes utilize much smaller
percentages. The Public Utility Holding Company Act, for example,
utilizes 10 percent of voting stock ownership, while the Bank Holding
Company Act and the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act utilize
25 percent as the standard?' The administrative regulations under these
statutes go even further, providing that as little as 5 percent (in the case
of banks) and 10 percent (in the case of savings and loan institutions)
20. Securities Act of 1933 Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1995). This formulation built on
the initial statutory attempt in the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1993 that intro-
duced the standard of "control" as "the power to exercise control or managemenL" 48 Stat. 211,
218 (1933).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7) (1988). "Controlling influence" also
appears in the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(2)(c) (1995), the Savings
and Loan Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1467a(a)(2) (1995); the Investment Company
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1988), among others.
22. E.g., Savings and Loan Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1467a(a)(l)(H) (Supp.
1995); Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(40) (1988); Securities Act of 1933 Rules
144, 405, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144, 230.405 (1994).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 79b(7); 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(2).
19961
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gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of "control" when combined with
certain other indicia of interrelatedness.24 But in almost all instances,
numerical standards of stock ownership are strengthened by alternative
functional standards focusing on the realities of the power relationship
within the corporation. In this manner, the realities, not corporate forms,
are decisive.25
Reflecting their very different objectives, the tax laws differ from
the regulatory statutes in their approach to corporate groups in several
respects. While the tax laws also focus on "control," they define the
term exclusively in arithmetical terms of the percentage of stock owner-
ship and contain no alternative functional standard. For many purposes,
the tax laws specify majority stock ownership, formulated in no less
than four different ways in different sections of the Code.26 However,
in certain provisions dealing with groups, including important provisions
dealing with corporate reorganizations and consolidated returns, the tax
laws define "control" in terms of 80 percent stock ownership. Indeed,
there are no less than five different formulations of an 80 percent stan-
dard in the tax laws.27
"Control" defined in terms of 80 percent stock ownership in a tax
revenue-raising statute manifestly is intended to serve a very different
purpose than the use of the term "control" in a regulatory statute. Nev-
ertheless, a number of regulatory statutes incorporate the 80 percent tax
standard. Thus, the comprehensive federal statute regulating employer
liability in funding employer-sponsored pension programs imposes lia-
bility on the "controlled corporate group," defined by reference to the
consolidated group provisions in the tax laws turning on 80 percent
ownership.'
24. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.31(d)(1), 574.4 (1994).
25. Thus, the Supreme Court in the celebrated Rochester decision, stated that "control" was
to be determined by a regard for "actualities in such intercorporate relationships" and to encom-
pass every type of control in fact. Rochester Tel. Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145-46
(1939). The Court later emphasized that it was "reject[ing] artificial tests for 'control."'
Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151, 163, reh'g denied, 353 U.S. 989 (1957).
26. See BLUMBERG, LCG-V, supra note 6, at ch. 15.
27. See BLUMBERG, LCG-V, supra note 6, §§ 15.03-15.07.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2612.3 (1994).
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b. The "Integrated Enterprise" Standard in Federal Labor,
Employment, and Discrimination Lav
The labor, employment, and discrimination laws use a very different
standard developed by an administrative agency, rather than the courts.
The National Labor Relations Board has expanded the scope of these
statutes through the introduction of the unique functional standard of
the "integrated enterprise" to determine whether related corporations are
to be treated as a "single employer" in the administration of the statuto-
ry program.29 This arose as a pragmatic response to problems caused
by multiple incorporation and "runaway" shops designed to sidestep
union organizing and contracts.
Through reliance on the concept of "control" or the "integrated en-
terprise" doctrine, numerous federal and state statutes of specific appli-
cation regulate major industries in the American society by extending
the statutory program to include the corporate group as a whole rather
than restricting the statutes' scope to the component corporation of the
group that actually conducts the regulated activity. Enterprise concepts
have prevailed in the regulation of public utilities, banking, savings and
loan companies, insurance companies, securities and investment compa-
nies, casino gambling, employee retirement benefits, major areas in in-
come taxation-federal and state---and foreign trade and investment.
These are briefly reviewed below.
2. Public Utility Holding Companies
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935" (PU-CA) was
the first major federal statute to adopt enterprise principles as the basis
for the pervasive regulation of a major American industry. Utilizing and
expanding concepts of "control" introduced by the Emergency Trans-
portation Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, PUHCA dealt with the widespread abuses and
insolvencies of the nation's major utility chains by concentrating its
regulatory provisions on the utility holding company system as a whole.
It reorganized and simplified the corporate structure of the entire indus-
try by requiring geographical and functional integration of each system,
by restricting systems to no more than three tiers of subsidiary com-
panies, and by regulating strictly transactions with other companies in
29. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Servs, Inc.,
380 U.S. 255 (1965). See BLUMBERG, LCG-IV, supra note 6, §§ 13.06, 14.03.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 et seq. (1988).
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the group, as well as affiliated companies and interests. PUHCA proved
to be a widely acknowledged success, and its regulatory techniques
have been followed widely in numerous subsequent regulatory statutes
of significance.
3. Financial Institutions
a. Banking and Savings and Loan Institutions
The American banking industry is governed both by the federal
government and the state governments through an overlapping and con-
fusing series of regulatory programs of great complexity. No less than
three federal agencies have serious areas of responsibility, and in the
case of banks chartered under state law, the state banking departments
serve as still another regulatory agency.
Whatever the agency for regulation, American banking law, federal
and state, is committed firmly to enterprise law. Building on concepts
introduced by the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the
Investment Company Act of 1940,31 the Bank Holding Company Act
of 195632 is one of the nation's most comprehensive statutes in its perva-
sive reliance on the concept of "control." It and its sister statute, the
Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments Act of 1967, 33 have
served as a model for much of American regulatory law seeking to
regulate holding company systems. While the definition of "control" in
the Act provides that 25 percent ownership or control of voting shares
gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of "control," administrative regu-
lations, as noted, go further.34
The Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments Act of 1967
is substantially the same.31 State banking law also focuses on the fi-
nancial holding company, and in many respects follows federal law and
enterprise principles in authorizing regulation of bank and savings and
loan holding companies in statutes modeled after the federal bank and
savings and loan holding company statutes. 6
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a et seq. (1988).
32. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 et seq. (1988).
33. Pub.L. 90-255, Feb. 14, 1968, 82 Stat. 5.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 225.31(d)(l)-(2) (1995). They provide that as
little as 5 percent of voting stock ownership will suffice where it is combined with certain
other indicia of corporate interrelationship. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(2) (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 574.4 (1994).
36. See BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 6, § 4.03.
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The distinctive lines between banks and savings and loan institu-
tions have become blurred. The pressures to permit well capitalized
banks to participate in the rehabilitation of savings and loan institutions
in distress has accelerated this process. Increasingly, the industry is be-
ing dominated by financial holding companies with affiliates in both
industries. Pressures in the Congress appear to be on the verge of re-
versing six decades of American law by adding investment banking to
the list of permissible activities for such institutions. While many would
also add insurance to the spectrum of services permissible for banks to
provide, this movement, which at one point in the current Congress had
appeared close to success, appears to have been defeated at least for the
time being. These proposals highlight the role of holding company
regulatory law in determining the scope of the enterprise.
American banking laws have undergone change in recent years to
encourage entry of foreign banks and subsidiaries into the American
market, to regulate their conduct of American business, and to establish
certain restrictions on the extent of their market share. In a series of
statutes, including the International Banking Act of 1978,' the Foreign
Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991,'8 and the Riegle-Neal In-
terstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994," American
law has responded to the increased participation of foreign banks in Ameri-
can banking markets. Competitive opportunities have been broadened,
and the scope of American regulation widened. Pursuant to the 1994
statute, American officials have commenced work on a study to deter-
mine whether foreign banks should be required to conduct banking op-
erations in the United States through subsidiaries (subject to more far-
reaching American regulation than branches). ° At the same time, both
the federal standards for citizenship and residence of directors of na-
tional banks and comparable state requirements for directors of state
37. 12 US.C. §§ 3101 et seq. (1988).
38. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (1995).
39. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994), (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
40. International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101 et seq. (1988); 105 Star. 2236
(1991), (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Pub. L No. 103-328, 108 Stat.
2338 (1994). See BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 6, §4.14.
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banks have been significantly relaxed.4 All the regulatory statutes in
the financial area rest on enterprise principles.
b. Insurance
The regulation of the insurance industry presents a unique chapter
in American jurisprudence. By reason of a nineteenth century decision
of the Supreme Court holding that insurance was not "commerce" with-
in the federal power to regulate interstate commerce,42 insurance regu-
lation commenced solely on the state level. By the time constitutional
thinking had changed, and the Court was prepared to recognize the as-
sertion of federal control over insurance, state regulation was well-en-
trenched. In the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1944,'3 the Congress di-
rected that insurance continue to be governed by state regulation. In
order to head off pressures for federal regulation two decades later, the
industry joined state regulators in supporting the Model Insurance Hold-
ing Company System Regulatory Act (1969) ' that was adopted by vir-
tually all the states. Building on the Federal Banking and Savings and
Loan Holding Company Acts, the Model Act focussed on the insurance
holding company and on insurance holding company systems and used
the familiar standards of "control" developed in the federal statutes and
regulations. Notwithstanding extensive regulation of the parent corpora-
tion and the holding company system, the Model Act provides, howev-
er, that the home states of insurer companies remain their primary regu-
lators.45
When well-publicized scandals in the 1980s identified areas of in-
adequate supervision, pressures for federal intervention again increased.
In response, the Model Act was strengthened and revised to diffuse the
41. E.g., 12 U.S.C.A § 72 (1995) (substitutes majority for two-thirds in residency require-
ments for directors of national banks; Comptroller of Currency authorized to permit minority of
directors to be aliens in the case of national banks that are subsidiaries or affiliates of foreign
banks). For state banks, see BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 6, § 4.14.2.
42. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1988).
44. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MODEL REG. SERV. 440-1 et
seq. (1992). The Model Act defines "control" in terms closely following those of the Savings
and Loan Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1467(a) (1995). Many of the states, however,
introduce their own variations, with presumptions of "control" ranging from 5 percent stock
ownership in Alabama to 25 percent in Oklahoma. Most follow the regulations under the Sav-
ings and Loan Holding Company Act regulations and specify 10 percent. See BLUMBERG, LCG-
VI, supra note 6, § 7.04.
45. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MODEL REG. SERV. 440-1 et
seq. (1992).
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movement for federalization.6 This procedure for voluntary acceptance
of regulation is unique in the American experience.
Insurance has joined banking, savings and loan, public utilities, and
casino gambling as the areas in American federal and state law in
which the holding company and the corporate group are major subjects
of regulatory concern. These statutes regulate the holding company sys-
tems conducting the regulated activities and extend the outer boundaries
of statutory obligation to all component companies of the system
whether or not the company itself is engaged in the regulated activities.
Similarly, the statutes extend the regulatory program to apply statutory
provisions regarding disclosure and regulation of transactions with "in-
siders" to all companies in the system and affiliated companies and
interests as well.
4. Securities and Investment Companies
Unlike the statutes dealing with banking, savings and loan, and in-
surance, the federal statutes dealing with the public offering and sale of
securities, regulation of broker-dealers, stock exchanges and public
companies listed on stock exchanges, and regulation of investment com-
panies (the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940) do not focus on the
holding company. Though not pervasive, as in other statutes, enterprise
principles play a major role in these areas as well. "Control" serves as
the cornerstone of vital provisions in the statutes. It underlies the statu-
tory provisions for imposition on secondary liability of "controlling per-
sons" for all statutory violations, and it widely expands the outer
boundaries of a number of other major areas of the regulatory pro-
grams.4
7
These three statutes and the administrative regulations thereunder
are historic pioneers in attempting to establish "control" as the source
of federal authority in this area. Although "control" plays a major
role in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, definition was left to administrative
formulation and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") es-
tablished the wide-ranging contours of statutory application with the
46. MODEL REVISED INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTFm REGULATORY ACt (1984); NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MODEL REG. SERv. 440-27 et seq. (1992).
47. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(3), 77c(a)(2). 77o. 77s(a). 77aa Sched. A(25)
(1988); Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(18). 78k. 781(b)(1). 78m(b)(1).
78m(e)(2), 78t (1988); Investment Company Act of 1940. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(3)(C), SMa-
2(a)(19). 80a-3(b)(2) (1988).
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definition of "control" previously noted.' This definition borrows from
and harmonizes with the statutory definition in the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act of 1935, administered by the same agency.49
In the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Congress borrowed
from both the administrative gloss on the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the
model of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 for the
comprehensive definition of "control" in the statute. It reworked themes
that had become familiar rather than introducing still other standards.50
5. Casino Gambling
Casino gambling or gaming has become an American industry of
considerable magnitude. Often, subsidiaries of publicly held corporate
groups of size, listed on the stock exchange, conduct the gambling fa-
cilities. In the absence of any federal regulation, state law governs this
area, with the states in which the facilities are located assuming the
primary regulatory responsibility.
Because of its vulnerability to public exploitation and to control by
criminal elements, the leading American states recognizing such activity
as lawful, starting with Nevada and now including Mississippi, New
Jersey, Illinois, and Louisiana as well, have enacted comprehensive stat-
utes that expansively extend the regulatory program to include all the
companies (including their officers, directors, and certain shareholders)
comprising the corporate group of which the licensed gambling subsid-
iary is a part. Modeled after the most far-reaching of the federal stat-
utes, the various state casino gambling regulatory programs uniformly
extend their disclosure, divestiture, and license disqualification provi-
sions throughout the group as a whole.5'
Federal regulation of financial institutions including banks and sav-
ings and loan institutions and financial holding companies, the regula-
tion of public utility holding company systems, securities and invest-
ment companies and state regulation of insurance holding company sys-
tems and of casino gambling represent the areas of greatest triumph of
enterprise principles in American law.52
48. E.g., Securities Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1995).
49. See supra notes 19-22.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1988).
51. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 220 (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 4:601-686 (West
Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-76-1 to -313 (1991 & Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 463.010-.720 (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to -208 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
52. See BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 6, § 13.02.
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6. Employer-Sponsored Pension Programs
The Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the basic
American statute regulating employer-sponsored retirement income or
pension programsra is grounded firmly on enterprise principles. These
principles determine the scope of employer financial liability under the
Act. The Act provides for separate treatment of multi-employer plans
and other plans. With respect to multi-employer plans, the Act employs
enterprise principles expressly providing that "trades or businesses...
under common control" constitute a "single employer.'"'
The regulations utilize the concept of the "controlled group of cor-
porations" as the determining standard for businesses "under common
control" and define the term by reference to one of the 80 percent
stock ownership standards of the Internal Revenue Code. Borrowed
from § 1563 of the Code, this refers to "ownership of stock possessing
at least 80 percent of the combined voting power of all classes of
stock ... or at least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all
classes of stock."55
However, ERISA does not depart from entity law principles in de-
termining liability of a single employer, and the courts have refused, in
most cases, to impose contribution or withdrawal liability under the
statute upon a parent corporation (or other controlling shareholder), ex-
cept on compliance with the principles of "piercing the veil."' How-
ever, a number of courts have made it plain that the traditional princi-
ples are significantly relaxed in order to achieve the statutory objec-
tive.'
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
54. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1301(b)(1) (West 1995).
55. LR.C. § 1563 (1995); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(i)(A) (1994). The Employees Retire-
ment Income Security Act incorporates the regulations of the Internal Revenue Service. 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 1301(b)(1), 1302(b)(3) (West 1995).
56. See BLUMBERG, LCG-IV, supra note 6, § 16.03.
57. See, e.g., Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1986)
([F]ederal courts will look closely at the purpose of the federal statute to determine
whether the statute places importance on the corporate form ... , an inquiry that
usually gives less respect to the corporate form than does the strict common law alter
ego doctrine .... Indeed deferring too readily to the corporate identity may run
contrary to the explicit purposes of the Act . . . .Allowing the shareholders of a
marginal corporation to invoke the corporate shield in circumstances where it is ineq-
uitable for them to do so and thereby avoid obligations to employee benefit plans
would seem precisely the typ of conduct Congress wanted to prevent).
See also United Steel Workers of Am. v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1988)
(statutory violation accepted as the fraudulent or inequitable conduct required for "piercing").
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7. Taxation
a. Federal Income Taxation
The Federal Internal Revenue Code contains extensive provisions
dealing with the relations of American taxpayers with affiliated corpora-
tions, including their foreign affiliates. Among these, the most promi-
nent are provisions authorizing reallocation of income and expense per-
taining to intragroup transactions including transfer pricing, elaborate
provisions for treatment of intragroup payments of interest, dividends,
and liquidation distributions involving foreign group components as well
as extensive provisions dealing with "controlled foreign subsidiaries." '
Commencing with an abortive effort in a World War I excess prof-
its tax regulation, the federal income tax system speedily adopted enter-
prise principles as an essential feature of an efficient tax collection sys-
tem. It has done so efficiently through use of various formulations of
the concept of "control." However, unlike the regulatory statutes, the
federal tax laws define "control" in terms of a specified amount of
stock ownership. In some cases, the tax laws require a high proportion
of stock ownership, including, in some cases, non-voting shares as
well.59 Here, the term "control" is being used in a sense quite differ-
ent from its invariable meaning in the regulatory statutes to refer to
"the power to direct or command the direction of the policies or man-
agement of a corporation. ' 60
Many provisions define "control" in terms of majority stock owner-
ship. It is an interesting illustration of the vagaries of legislative draft-
ing that the Code contains no less than four different models in imple-
menting this particular approach. 6' A very different class of provisions,
however, use the concept of the "controlled group" turning on 80 per-
cent stock ownership; there are no less than five different models of
such provisions in the Code.62 The 80 percent standard applies to the
58. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 245, 367, 482, 861(b), 862(b), 863, 864, 902, 951-64, 6038, 6038A
(1994).
59. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 368(c), 582(b), 1504(a)(2), 1551(b), 1563 (80 per cent stock ownership
required); I.R.C. §§ 368(c), 582(b) (non-voting shares included); I.R.C. §§ 246A, 267(f), 382(),
1504(a)(2), 1551(b), 1563 (referring to "total value" of all the stock).
60. Securities Act of 1933 Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1995).
61. These range from "at least" 50 percent to "more than" 50 percent. At the same time, the
base to which the percentage is applied varies from "voting power of stock" and "total value"
to "voting power" or "total value." See BLUMBERO, LCG-V, supra note 6, §§ 15.09-15.13.
62. These all specify "at least 80 percent." However, the base to which the percentage is
applied ranges from "the voting stock," Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3(b), to "each class of stock,"
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provisions of the Code facilitating economic combination by making
certain corporate combinations and acquisitions tax-free. It also appears
in the provisions dealing with the filing of a consolidated return for all
qualifying members of a group rather than by each separate affiliated
corporation. As a result, the consolidated group does not include all
majority-owned subsidiaries.'
In order to achieve the clarity and ease of application essential for
a tax statute, the tax statutes rely solely on an express numerical stan-
dard, eschewing any resort to the functional standards of "control" so
prominently employed in the application of enterprise principles in the
American regulatory law. The Internal Revenue Code, however, effec-
tively prevents tax evasion through manipulation of the numerical stan-
dards by introducing an alternative functional standard. Section 482 au-
thorizes reallocation by the administrative agency of income, deductions,
and tax credits or allowances between "organizations, trades, or busi-
nesses ... owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same inter-
ests [in order to] prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the[ir]
income .... 6'
b. State Income Taxation
Similarly, state tax law widely relies on comparable concepts of
"control" in dealing with the tax problems presented by transactions
between taxpayers and their controlling and controlled corporations (and
shareholders) and those under common control." In addition, state tax
law widely includes broad-reaching provisions dealing with the tax
problems presented by corporate groups. Some states require the filing
of consolidated or combined returns by all groups, while many more
require such filing when directed by the tax authorities or certain other
circumstances.6 Finally, state law widely follows federal law in autho-
rizing reallocation by the state tax authorities of income, deductions,
credits, and allowances in the case of treatment of the tax consequences
IR.C. § 582(b), to "total voting power. . . and. . . total value," LR.C. § 1504(a)(2). to "total
combined voting power . . . and . . . total number of shares of all other classes [non-voting]
of stock," I.R.C. § 368(c), and to "total combined voting power . . . or . . . total value of all
classes [of stock]," I.R.C. §§ 1551(b). 1563 (emphasis added). See BLUMDtOG. LCG-V. supra
note 6, §§ 15.03-15.07.
63. I.R.C. §§ 351-54, 368, 1501-1504.
64. LR.C. § 482.
65. BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 6, § 8.06.
66. See BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 6, §§ 8.07.1-8.07.4.
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of transactions between taxpayers, affiliated corporations, and related
parties.
In the case of a business taxpayer of significant size, the various
states almost inevitably face the difficult problem of allocation of the
taxpayer's liability among all the jurisdictions in which the taxpayer (or,
in the case of consolidated returns, the taxpayer and its affiliated com-
panies within the corporate group) are conducting business. The Uni-
form Division of Principal and Income for Tax Purposes Act,67 adopt-
ed by most states, deals with this problem through the concept of uni-
tary tax apportionment.
Unitary tax apportionment determines tax liability by providing for
the filing of a consolidated or combined return for the affiliated corpo-
rations of the group, on which a total tax is first computed. The appro-
priate fraction of the total tax attributable to the jurisdiction in question
is then apportioned by determining the proportion that the in-state busi-
ness activities bear to the total activities of the group. This typically is
accomplished by use of a three-factor formula, such as the in-state pro-
portionate share of the total assets, revenues, or income of the group.68
The constitutionality of measurement of the tax liability of a local
subsidiary through such unitary tax apportionment has been litigated
extensively. This has been most severe where the statute has had world-
wide application, including foreign-based as well as United States-based
multinational corporate groups. Such expansive assertion of tax juris-
diction has stirred a storm of international controversy.69
In a series of celebrated decisions resting on enterprise principles,
the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that unitary tax apportionment is
constitutional so long as the taxing authorities can establish that the
taxpayer is a part of a group conducting a "unitary business." The
"unitary business" standard considers the "underlying economic reali-
ties" to determine the "unity or diversity of [the] business enterprise"
involved. The Court defines "unitary business" as a "functionally inte-
67. 7A U.L.A. 336 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
68. Id. See BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 6, § 8.05.
69. Although the controversy involves the manner of apportionment of tax due from the af-
filiate within the jurisdiction, not the imposition of tax liability on units beyond the jurisdiction,
the impact is severe. It is contended that the application of the method to foreign affiliates of a
multinational group imposes excessive accounting costs, threatens multiple taxation, and because
of the relatively higher profitability of foreign business, results in a higher tax liability in the
aggregate than if tax liability were computed on a separate taxpayer basis in the ordinary
course. See Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994); Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 909 (1983).
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grated enterprise" with "centralization of management and economies of
scale" or as a "highly integrated business which benefits from an um-
brella of centralized management and controlled interaction." '
The use of this method of taxation on a multinational basis has
provoked a high level of criticism from foreign powers. Although the
Congress did not respond to the criticism, the American executive
branch was able to persuade the states utilizing world-wide unitary tax
apportionment to restrict use of the method to the American compo-
nents of a group; these are the so-called water's edge statutes.
However, tidying up the determination of tax upon foreign corpo-
rate groups for the years prior to the amendment of the statutes contin-
ued to give rise to litigation for a while. Thus, in the recent Barclays
Bank litigation,7 which involved tax years prior to repeal of the world-
wide scope of the California unitary tax apportionment statute, the
Court dealt with an issue that its earlier decisions had left open. In
Container Corporation of America, Inc.,' the Court had held that, in-
sofar as foreign commerce was concerned, the use of this method of tax-
ation for unitary businesses was constitutional where the parent corpora-
tion of the group was an American corporation. In Barclay's Bank, a
case involving a British-based multinational banking group with a Cali-
fornia affiliate, the Court upheld the constitutionality of such tax appor-
tionment in the case of groups under "control" of a foreign parent cor-
poration as well.
8. Foreign Trade and Investment
a. Export Controls
For decades, American law dealing with export controls or related
measures in protection of national security interests, implementation of
foreign policy objectives, or economic objectives, has employed enter-
prise principles. In these areas, administrative agencies, rather than the
Congress, have delineated the outer boundaries of the regulatory pro-
gram. In defining its range of application, the statutes expansively refer
to "persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"7' while
70. Exxon Corp v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 224 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438, 440-41 (1980).
71. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. CL 2268 (1994). Accord Colgat.Pal-
molive Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
72. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, reh'g denied 464 U.S. 909
(1983).
73. First War Powers Act of 1941, 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1988), 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1988);
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leaving it to the administering agencies entrusted with the programs to
define the jurisdictional sweep more precisely. The intensity of the for-
eign policy objectives involved, as perceived by the administration in-
volved, has dictated the outcome. Where the pressure has been acute,
the statutory phrase has been defined in broad terms to include all con-
trolled corporations, including foreign subsidiaries and, thus, to embrace
all constituent companies in the corporate group. In other cases, in or-
der to avoid international confrontation, foreign subsidiaries have been
excluded.
Thus, in the imposition of export controls to implement American
foreign policy objectives to isolate Communist China after the Korean
War and the Soviet Union during subsequent decades, the administrative
regulations expanded the sweep of the program to include foreign sub-
sidiaries of American groups.74 Subsequently, similar controls were
imposed on foreign subsidiaries of American groups with respect to
transactions with Iran and Iraq.75
Where American objectives have differed from the objectives of the
host countries, as has occurred in the extraterritorial application of
American law in the Chinese and Siberian Pipeline embargoes, pro-
found international controversies erupted in which English, French, and
Dutch governments and courts successfully resisted such American ef-
forts.76 Most recently, the long-standing sanctions directed at Cuba
have been expanded to include foreign subsidiaries.' In other situa-
tions, American economic sanctions directed at Rhodesia, South Africa,
Libya, and, as noted, Cuba, did not extend to foreign subsidiaries, usu-
ally for competitive reasons to protect American business abroad.78
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988); Export Admin-
istration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988); Export Administration Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841, 842 (expired 1979).
74. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1988); 50 U.S.C. app. §§
2401-2420 (1988); Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1994).
75. Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535 (1994); Iraqi Sanctions Regulations,
31 C.F.R. § 575 (1994).
76. See BLUMBERG, LCG-V, supra note 6, §§ 20.06, 21.05. For instances of European judi-
cial action frustrating United States extraterritorial assertions, see S.A. Societe Fruehauf-France v.
Massardy, Judgment of May 22, 1965, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1968] D.S. Jur. 147, [1965] J.C.P.
II no. 14274, 5 I.L.M. 476 (1966); Compagnie Europeene des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland
B.V. No.82/716 (Dist. Ct., The Hague, Sept. 17, 1982), 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983).
77. Although the original Cuban regulations literally included foreign subsidiaries of American
groups under the ban, this was not enforced in cases "where local law requires, or policy in the
third country favors trade with Cuba." Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.329,
515.559(a)(3)(b) (1994).
78. Rhodesian Sanction Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 530 (1976); South African Transactions
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This area provides one of the outstanding examples of the challeng-
es to the international legal order arising from the extraterritorial appli-
cation of enterprise principles to multinational corporations and their
foreign subsidiaries. The experience of the United States with respect to
the China embargo and Siberian Pipeline embargo should leave no
doubt of the inevitability of the confrontation arising from such pro-
grams, even with a nation's closest allies. It also should leave little
doubt that such extraterritorial application is doomed to failure when
firmly opposed by any great power that hosts the foreign subsidiary in
question.
b. Foreign Investment in the United States
For decades, the United States has restricted foreign investment and
membership of foreign nationals on boards of directors in particularly
sensitive areas of the economy including aviation, communications,
fishing, government procurement, and other areas such as energy, min-
ing, and shipping. Although these restrictions have been somewhat
modified in recent years, most remain fully effective. 9 In addition, in
1989, Congress gave the President the authority to prohibit acquisitions
of control of United States corporations by foreign interests where a
threat to national security was involved. The statute includes any acqui-
sition by a person "directly or indirectly controlled" by a foreign per-
son, including a United States corporation acquired for the purpose of
acquiring another American corporation contrary to the statuteW This
sweeping power has been invoked only once.
Other statutes have focused on disclosure of foreign investment in
the United States without regulating the inflow of foreign funds. These
statutes and implementing regulations are drafted in a sophisticated
manner including comprehensive definitions of "parent," "affiliate," and
"foreign parent" that utilize a benchmark of 10 percent equity stock
ownership as the level requiring reporting."'
Although years ago most of the states made ownership of land by
non-citizens and non-residents unlawful, such limitations have long
since been repealed or extensively modified. Only a few states have
significant restrictions of this nature.'
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 545 (1994); Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.R. § 550 (1994).
79. See BLUMBERG, LCG-V, supra note 6, at ch. 27.
80. 50 U.S.CA. app. §2170 (1995) (Exon-Florio amendment).
81. 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508 (1988); 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988); R.C. §§ 6038A(c)(3).
7701(a)(30) (1988); 7 C.F.R. § 781 (1994); 15 C.FJL § 806 (1994).
82. For example, the "Wsconsin statute is limited to ownership of more than 320 acres of
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c. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
This statute regulates American business practices abroad by prohib-
iting bribes of foreign governmental officials to obtain business and
requiring adequate internal accounting control systems for recording
such transactions. From a jurisprudential point of view, the statute is
particularly interesting because it seeks to achieve its objectives by im-
posing statutory obligations on American parent companies and does
not apply literally to their foreign subsidiaries in any respect. However,
the American parent corporation cannot comply with the statute unless
it sees to it that the conduct of its foreign subsidiaries complies with
the statutory restrictions.83 This is a unique example in American law
of indirectly achieving enterprise regulation of a group while, in form,
restricting the regulatory program to the parent company.
d. Arab Boycott of Israel
The statute and implementing regulations restricting American par-
ticipation in the secondary and tertiary Arab boycott of Israel are drawn
carefully to focus on efforts by American corporations and American
individuals without unduly impeding American trade with the Arab
states. The program appears to have expansive breadth, applying to any
"United States person" and "any foreign subsidiary or affiliate...
controlled in fact." "Controlled in fact" is defined as the "authority or
ability of a domestic concern to establish general policies or to control
day-to-day operations" of the foreign subsidiary or establishment. There
is a rebuttable presumption that this standard is satisfied in the event of
50 percent voting stock ownership, or even 25 percent (if no large
block is outstanding) or interlocking majority representation on the
foreign board.84
However, the statute only applies to transactions in the "commerce
of the United States." This includes transactions of foreign-controlled
companies only when specifically directed, financed, or otherwise sup-
ported by a United States person, or involving goods and services pro-
cured from the United States. As a result, the statute does not interfere
with the general operations of American owned foreign subsidiaries and
agricultural land, and the South Carolina statute to ownership of 500,000 acres or more. See
BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 6, at ch. 11.
83. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l and -2 (1988).
84. Export Administration Act of 1985, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988); 15 C.F.R. §
769 (1995).
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affiliates so long as their United States parent does not directly control
their activities and United States-origin goods and services are not involved.O
C. Statutory Regulatory Law of General Application
In addition to the statutes specifically applying to corporate groups
which represent the greatest triumph of enterprise principles in Ameri-
can law, there has been widespread utilization of such principles in the
judicial construction and application of statutory regulatory law general-
ly. Even where statutes have not referred to groups at all, numerous
courts have introduced concepts of enterprise liability to attribute rights,
impose liabilities, and support exclusion of corporations affiliated with
the group that is being regulated or that is performing the prohibited
activity. The courts generally have done so whenever enterprise treat-
ment was required in order to implement the underlying policies and
objectives of the statutory program, prevent their frustration, or to pre-
vent evasion through the organization of a subsidiary corporation to
conduct the activity in question.
In some cases, the courts have reached such result simply through
analysis of the legislative action. Thus, as a distinguished American
judge, Judge Henry Friendly, observed many years ago: "We did not
think Congress meant the policies of that act 'to be defeated by the
fragmentation of an integrated business into a congeries of corporate
entities, however much these might properly be respected for other pur-
poses.' ',8 6 Courts have similarly given "remedial" statutes a "broad" or
"liberal" construction in order to carry out the legislative policies and
objectives! 7
As noted above in connection with the Employees Retirement Insur-
ance Security Act, still other courts have relied on an avowedly modi-
fied version of traditional "piercing the veil" jurisprudence. Because of
the need to implement the underlying purpose of the statute in question,
courts have applied enterprise principles, notwithstanding a subsidiary's
(or controlled corporation's) meticulous observance of corporate forms,
because, in statutory application, such forms receive "less respect" than
85. Export Administration Act of 1985, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401, 2407; 15 C.F.RL § 769.
86. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 437 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting Bowater
S.S. Co. v. Patterson, Ltd., 303 F.2d 369, 372 (2d Cir. 1962). cert. denied, 371 U.S. 860
(1962)).
87. After 60 years in which this philosophy of statutory construction was supreme, recent
decisions of the Court indicate that it may be abandoning this approach. See. e.g.. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 313 (1992).
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under the "strict common law alter ego doctrine" of "piercing the
veil.""8 They have also reached much the same result by weakening
further the rigorous standards for application of traditional "piercing the
veil jurisprudence." Numerous cases simply have disregarded an inabil-
ity to establish that the conduct in question was fraudulent or inequita-
ble,89 an indispensable elemenof the traditional doctrine in common-
law controversies.
1. Antitrust Law and Other Conspiracy Statutes
The Sherman Antitrust Act imposes criminal, as well as civil, sanc-
tions on conspiracies to monopolize.9° Although numerous previous de-
cisions of the Supreme Court had recognized that conspiracies between
constituent companies of corporate groups-that is, intra-enterprise con-
spiracies-might constitute a violation of the Act, the Court in
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.9' flatly held that a par-
ent and wholly owned subsidiary could not conspire under these sec-
tions. Emphasizing that the statute outlawed concerted activity, the
Court held that a parent and wholly owned subsidiary always have a
"unity of purpose or a common design" and that "their general corpo-
rate actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate
consciousnesses, but one."'  The Court considered any coordinated ac-
tivity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary to be that of a single
enterprise. Accordingly, it held that they could not conspire to monopo-
lize. It reserved decision with respect to partly owned subsidiaries.93
Numerous cases in the lower federal courts have considered the
application of the Copperweld doctrine in federal antitrust law cases
where the subsidiary had been only partly owned or where sister com-
panies, rather than parent and subsidiary corporations, were involved. In
the case of subsidiaries and sister companies overwhelmingly owned by
the parent, the enterprise principles of Copperweld have been applied
88. See Alman v. Danin, 802 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986); Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667
F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981); Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
89. See, e.g., United Steel Workers of Am. v. Connors Steel Co., 885 F.2d 1499, 1507-08
(11th Cir. 1988) (statutory violation sufficient in and of itself to provide essential element of
fraudulent or inequitable conduct).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988).
91. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
92. Id. at 771-72.
93. Id. at 776.
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uniformly,94 but in the case of lesser ownership, albeit majority control
or more, the cases are widely divided. 95
With a notable exception, courts applying state law also have fol-
lowed the Copperweld doctrine widely in cases arising under state anti-
trust statutes where wholly owned subsidiaries were concerned.9 In
the same manner, the state courts share the confusion in the lower
federal courts and have also divided widely over the application of the
doctrine to partly owned subsidiaries.Y
Since Copperweld's sweeping rejection of entity principles and
adoption of enterprise law in antitrust conspiracy, many courts have
applied the doctrine to parents and their wholly owned subsidiaries in
conspiracy cases arising not only under the Sherman Act, but also in
cases arising either at common law, the criminal law, or under other
statutes, including patent law. Not all have done so, distinguishing the
construction of the antitrust statute from conspiracy problems arising
under other areas of the law, including the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act. Other courts have refused to follow the
Copperweld analysis in areas other than antitrust even where wholly
owned subsidiaries were involved. 98
2. Environmental Law
In its environmental statutes, the United States has embarked on an
extensive regulatory program covering the generation, transportation,
and disposal of hazardous waste and imposing onerous financial clean-
up obligations on the "owner" or "operator" of a vessel or facility or
94. E.g., Leaco Enterprises, Inc. v. General kec. Co., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18162 (D. Or.
1990) (91.9 percent); Total Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Group Ins. Admin., Inc., 1993 US. Dist.
LEXIS 49 (E.D. La. 1993) (85 percent).
95. Compare Novatel Communications, Inc. v. Cellular Tel. Supply, Inc., 1986-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 957,412 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (51 percent); Magnum Force Distribs. v. Bon Co. of Am., 47
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1104 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (60 percent) (incapable of conspir-
acy) with American Vision Centers, Inc. v. Cohen, 711 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (54 per-
cent); Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1495 n.20 (79 percent of equity
and 100 percent of voting stock) (capable of conspiracy), vacated on other grounds. 475 U.S.
1105 (1986).
96. See BLuMmBERG, LCG-IV, supra note 6. § 14.03.2.
The Louisiana Supreme Court refused to follow Copper'eld in dealing with this problem
under the Louisiana statute. It approached the problem in conceptualist terms and applied tradi-
tional notions of entity law. It rejected the relevance of the enterprise analysis adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line
Co., 493 So. 2d 1149 (La. 1986).
97. See BLuMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 6, § 14.03.4.
98. See BLUMBERG, LCG-IV, supra note 6, §§ 7.02.1 nn.13b-c, 30.04 n.20 (Supp. 1995).
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on the person who "arranged" for disposition of hazardous wastes.99
Although there are important decisions rejecting enterprise princi-
ples," numerous courts have given "broad" or "liberal" construction
to the statutory terms to impose liability on parent corporations for acts
of their subsidiaries.' The cases turn on the degree of involvement
of the parent in the management of the affairs of the subsidiary. Courts
also have indicated that less involvement will suffice for a violation
based on "operator" status than on "owner" status.
As in the case of most authorities utilizing enterprise principles
rather than traditional entity law and imposing intra-enterprise liability
on component companies of corporate groups, this development rests, in
the final analysis, on the determination of the courts to construe the
remedial statutes in a manner which most effectively will implement
their objectives. However, that determination faces the resistance of
more conservative courts which have concluded that principles of limit-
ed liability should be respected, even when being applied for the pro-
tection of parent corporations (as distinct from their public sharehold-
ers), in the absence of a clear demonstration of Congressional intent to
impose such liability. This is one of the most vigorously litigated areas
in all American statutory law. It is also a subject over which the deci-
sions of the circuit courts of appeal are in conflict."°
3. Labor
Years ago, the National Labor Relations Board, through administra-
tive action, adopted the concept of an "integrated enterprise" to deter-
mine whether two or more related corporations comprised a "single
employer" for purposes of the National Labor Relation Act. With the
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1988); Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1625 (1986).
100. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1108 (1991); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Eppinger & Russel Co., 776 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D.
Fla. 1991), affd, 996 F.2d 1107 (l1th Cir. 1993).
101. E.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1084 (1991); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp, 777 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mich.
1991); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v.
Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064
(D. Idaho 1986); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987).
102. Compare Lansford-Coaldale Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993);
Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24; Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064 (alternate holding) (extensive
exercise of "control" sufficient) with United States v. Cordova Chem Co., 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir.
1995); Joslyn Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d 80 ("piercing the veil" standards determinative).
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approval of the Supreme Court, this functional standard, which focuses
on the economic reality of the employment relationship rather than on
the technical forms of corporate structure, has served as the foundation
for the Board's administration of the Labor Relations Act."ns
For almost 40 years, the standard has been applied uniformly and
has been utilized in administering federal statutory programs that deal
not only with labor relations, but with other employment programs, in-
cluding regulation of employee wages and hours and employment dis-
crimination statutes generally. The "integrated enterprise" standard under
the labor statutes involves four factors: interrelation of operations; cen-
tralized control of labor relations; common management; and common
ownership of financial control."°
In recent years, the "integrated enterprise" standard, which was
originally developed by an administrative agency and adopted by the
courts, has received explicit congressional recognition in the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1984;05 and the related 1991
amendments under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' ° Al-
though the statutes utilize "control" and "controlled" as the standard,
they define such terms according to the "integrated enterprise" standard
to determine the applicability of American anti-discrimination law to
foreign subsidiaries of American corporate groups. Most recently, the "integrat-
ed enterprise" standard has been adopted in the administration of the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988."°
Under these statutes, courts readily have imposed liability on parent
corporations for statutory violations of their subsidiaries by relying on
the "integrated enterprise" standard. Attempts to achieve this result in
reliance on traditional corporate law doctrines of "piercing the veil"
have been markedly less successful.
103. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (1988). The doctrine does not
apply to other areas of the labor relations law in which the Labor Board does not have primary
jurisdiction, such as contract actions in the district courts under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1988). See, e.g., Local Union 59, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Narnco Elec, Inc., 653
F.2d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1981). The application of two conflicting standards of jurispudence to
companion provisions of the labor relations law is one of the outstanding anomalies in Ameri-
can law. See BLwMBERG, LCG-IV, supra note 6, § 13.02.
104. 21 NLRB Ann. Rep. 14 (1956), approved in Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians
Local Union v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965) (per curiam). See
BLuMBERG, LCG-IV, supra note 6, §§ 13.03, 13.06, 14.05.
105. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(h) (1995).
106. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-l(b), (c) (1995).
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq. (1988). This statute requires 60 day notice of plant shutdowns
and relocations by employers of 100 or more full-time employees.
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4. Bankruptcy Law
American bankruptcy law has made use of enterprise principles in
four major areas to provide relief against parent corporations and other
related corporations or parties, contrary to the traditional entity law
concepts of corporation law. Judicial law-making has introduced enter-
prise principles in the administration of bankruptcy law in the areas of
substantive consolidation, equitable subordination, and treatment of in-
tra-group guaranties under the fraudulent transfer laws. Section 547 of
the Bankruptcy Code expressly recognizes enterprise law in its provi-
sions dealing with voidable preferential transfers.
a. Substantive Consolidation
Although the Bankruptcy Code is silent, the bankruptcy courts have
developed a body of enterprise law called substantive consolidation for
use in selected cases. Under this form of relief, where parent and sub-
sidiary corporations are being administered in bankruptcy, the separate
proceedings of the related corporations may be consolidated and all
their assets and liabilities pooled in the payment of claims. Courts ap-
ply the doctrine where such pooling will advance the interests of credi-
tors as a whole, even though the interests of some individual creditors
will be prejudiced." 8 They do so in proceedings involving corporate
groups (or controlled corporations and their controlling shareholders)
presenting such circumstances as the economic integration of the opera-
tions of the related companies, the intermingling of assets, records, and
accounts, a reduction in the time and expense of the proceedings that
consolidation will make possible, or where consolidation will contribute
to an increase in the feasibility of reorganization and continuance of the
enterprise. Under any of these circumstances, traditional entity concepts
are ignored and the proceedings are consolidated notwithstanding the
prejudice to individual creditors of one or another of the corporations in
question.'09
108. Application of the doctrine is intended to increase the total pool of assets available for
all creditors. While this will benefit creditors of those debtor companies in the proceedings
where the ratio of distributable assets to claims is lower than the ratio under such pooling, it
obviously will prejudice those creditors with claims against other debtor companies where the
ratio of distributable assets to claims on a separate company basis is higher.
109. See, e.g., In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988). See also
BLUMBERG, LCG-II, supra note 6, at ch. 10.
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Outside of the United States, New Zealand similarly has authorized
the pooling of assets and liabilities of related corporations in winding-
up proceedings." 0
b. Voidable Preferences
From 1898 to 1978, American bankruptcy law made voidable all
transfers by insolvent corporations in payment of an antecedent debt
within 120 days of filing the bankruptcy petition where it enabled a
creditor to receive more than it otherwise would have received in the
bankruptcy proceedings."'
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 dramatically revised
the earlier law. For such transfers generally, it reduced the period of
vulnerable transfers from four months to 90 days. While reducing the
application of the doctrine in this manner, the Code also strengthened it
by providing that insolvency was presumed during such period. In a
provision of importance with respect to corporate groups, § 547 dramat-
ically expanded the law. It made voidable all transfers of an insolvent
debtor within one year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition to
controlling persons and other "insiders" or "affiliates." For this purpose,
"insider" includes the parent corporation (or other person) in control of
the debtor as well as any 20 percent shareholder, 20 percent subsidiary,
or 20 percent owned sister subsidiary.' 2 It should be noted that com-
parable provisions now appear in the laws of a number of other coun-
tries, including Canada and New Zealand.' 3
Until overruled by the Congress, widespread judicial acceptance of
enterprise principles significantly expanded the coverage of § 547 to
include transfers to banks and other lenders in repayment of obligations
of the debtor that were guaranteed by "insiders." Under such circum-
stances, such transfers were voidable when made within a year of the
bankruptcy petition even where the banks or other lenders were not
110. New Zealand Companies Amendment Act §§ 315A. 315B (1980); In re Grazing & Ex-
port Meat Co., [1984] 1 N.Z. B.C.R. 668.
In British Commonwealth countries, so-called winding-up proceedings in the corporation
statutes, rather than a bankruptcy law, deal with the problem of insolvent corporations.
111. 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a), (b) (1976) (repealed 1978). These were sections 60a and 60b of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
112. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 547(b), (0 (1993); 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(2). (31)(B) and (31)(E) (1993).
113. R.S.C., ch. B-3 §§ 95-96, 100 (1985) (Can.) (one year); New Zealand Companies
Amendment Act, § 311C (1980) (three years).
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"insiders" because the repayments reduced the liability of the "insider"
guarantors.'
4
c. Equitable Subordination
Going back to landmark cases following the accession of Roosevelt
appointees to the federal bench," 5 American bankruptcy law has ac-
cepted firmly the doctrine of equitable subordination which rests on a com-
bination of enterprise principles and fiduciary concepts. Under the re-
vised doctrine, where a parent corporation or other controlling share-
holder has exercised inequitably its control over a bankrupt subsidiary
or controlled corporation to the detriment of the corporation or its pub-
lic security holders, a bankruptcy court has authority to order deferment
of the payment of all claims of a parent corporation (or controlling
shareholder) or other affiliate against the bankrupt debtor until the
claims of all other claimants have been satisfied." 6 This introduction
of enterprise doctrines in the formulation of equitable subordination has
expanded its use greatly in comparison with prior law in which subor-
dination rested on compliance with the rigorous requirements of "pierc-
ing the veil jurisprudence.!"" 7
d. Intra-Group Guaranties and Fraudulent Transfers
In a number of respects, American courts have adopted enterprise
principles in applying the fraudulent transfer laws to intra-group guaran-
ties. In the absence of intentional fraud, the fraudulent transfer laws,
whether under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or under state law, in-
volve a transfer or guaranty by an insolvent without "reasonably equiv-
alent consideration. ' ' h 8 Most corporate groups employ a high degree
114. In re Wesley Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 1438 (1lth Cir. 1994); In re Suffola, Inc., 2 F.3d 977
(9th Cir. 1993); Levitt v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th
Cir. 1989). These cases were overruled by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 11 U.S.C.A. §
550(c) (1995).
115. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
116. See BLUMBERG, LCG-ll, supra note 6, at chs. 3, 4.
117. Thus, in the famous Deep Rock case, the Supreme Court, relying on the revised doctrine,
granted relief which the Circuit Court of Appeals had denied because the conditions for "pierc-
ing the veil" could not be satisfied. Compare Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S.
307 (1939) with Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 96 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1938), rev'd, 306
U.S. 307 (1939).
118. This is the standard of § 548(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and § 5(b) of the Uni-
form Fraudulent Transfer Act. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988); 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985). Sections
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of financial interdependence among the component companies. This fre-
quently includes a guaranty by one component company in a group of
the indebtedness of another. Under entity law analysis, looking at such
transactions as arm's length transactions between separate interests, the
validity of such guaranties is doubtful. However, through increasing use
of enterprise analysis, courts have upheld the validity of such guaranties
by recognizing that the affiliated parties are part of the same enterprise
and that the borrowing strengthens the guarantor as well as the affiliat-
ed borrower by strengthening the financial position of the group." 9
D. Judicial Decisions Adopting Enterprise Principles
1. Substantive Common Law
In contrast to American statutory law, particularly the statutes of
specific application where enterprise principles have had such
widespread acceptance in shaping the evolving law, the courts have
been much less ready to apply enterprise concepts in the place of tradi-
tional principles of entity law. Although enterprise principles have been
frequently accepted in such areas of judge-made law as jurisdiction and
torts, the determination of controversies by reference to entity law con-
tinues as a vital, if not predominant, force in American law. The only
recognized exception to this rule is courts' alternative use of "piercing
the veil" jurisprudence.
In a few instances, enterprise principles have been recognized and
applied as such.120 In most decisions, however, the attribution to a par-
ent corporation or other affiliated corporation of legal consequences
arising from the acts of its subsidiary or affiliate has rested on a court's
3 and 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which had previously served as the basis
for most state law and the federal Bankruptcy Act, replaced by the Code in 1978, required "fair
consideration" and "good faith." 11 U.S.C. § 107d(s)(2) (1976); 7A U.LA. 448. 474 (1985).
However, the change in wording has not led to a significant difference in result.
119. Intra-group guaranties may be made by a parent corporation of the debt of a subsidiary
(down-stream guaranty), a guaranty by a subsidiary of the debt of its parent (up-stream guaran-
ty), and a guaranty by one subsidiary of the debt of a sister subsidiary (cross.stream guaranty).
While down-stream guaranties present few problems because strengthening the subsidiary im-
proves the net worth of the parent's investment in the subsidiary, the validity of up-stream guaran-
ties and cross-stream guaranties largely rest on enterprise analysis. See Phillip I. Blumberg,
Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-Stream and Downstream) Guaranties under the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, 9 CARDoZO L. REv. 685 (1987).
120. An outstanding example is the "single enterprise" doctrine in isolated Louisiana and
North Carolina cases. See Pine Tree Assocs. v. Doctors' Assocs., Inc, 654 So. 2d 735 (La. CL
App. 1995); Green v. Champion Ins. Co. 577 So. 2d 249 (La. CL App. 1991); Glenn v. Wag-
ner, 313 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 329 SaE.2d 326 (N.C. 1985).
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relaxation of the rigorous requirements for "piercing the corporate veil"
under traditional doctrines of entity law.' 2' In some cases, "agency"
has served as a basis for application of enterprise principles even
though the requirements of traditional agency law had not been satis-
fied.'2
In all American jurisdictions, private controversies at common law
involving the attribution of intra-enterprise tort or contract liability are
governed generally by traditional principles of entity law. Only in
"rare" or "exceptional" cases2 do American courts escape from the
strict confines of entity law by invoking the doctrine of "piercing the
corporate veil." This is a creation of nineteenth century equity jurispru-
dence under which equity courts disregard corporate forms where re-
quired to prevent fraud.
As stated by the Supreme Court of Texas in Castleberry v.
Branscum, American "piercing the veil" has taken a number of forms:
We disregard the corporate fiction, even though corporate for-
malities have been observed and corporate and individual prop-
erty have been kept separately when the corporate form has
been used as part of a basically unfair devise to achieve an
inequitable result .... Specifically ... (1) when the fiction is
used as a means of perpetuating fraud; (2) where a business is
organized and operated as a mere tool or business conduit of
another corporation; (3) where the corporate fiction is resorted
to as a means of evading an existing legal obligation; (4) where
the corporate fiction is employed to achieve or perpetuate mo-
nopoly; (5) where the corporate fiction is used to circumvent a
statute; and (6) where the corporate fiction is relied on as pro-
tection of crime or to justify wrong. 24
121. E.g., United Steel Workers of Am. v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.
1988); Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3 (lst Cir. 1986). Such decisions typically eliminate the
traditional requirement that the controlled corporation has been employed in a fraudulent or in-
equitable manner. Commission of a tort or violation of a statute has been accepted by this mi-
nority to satisfy the requirement.
122. For discussion of the use of "quasi-agency" doctrines, see BLUMBERG, LCG-.I, supra note
6, §§ 1.02.2, 4.02.1, 4.04.1; BLUMBERG, LCG-III, supra note 6, §§ 6.06, 14.03.3.
123. See, e.g., Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 983 (1982).
124. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271-72 (Tex. 1987) (quoting Pacific Am.
Gasoline Co. v. Miller, 76 S.W.2d 833, 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)) (footnotes omitted). The
following year, the Texas Legislature overruled the decision insofar as contract matters were
concerned. TEx. Bus. CORP. ANN., art. 221A (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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The court then added inadequate capitalization as still another basis for
disregarding a corporate entity.2 5
Although the Texas court also distinguished "piercing the veil" from
the "alter ego" doctrine, most courts have refused to do so, treating the
"alter ego" concept and the so-called "instrumentality" doctrine. This
latter doctrine has been accepted widely as a statement of the principles
governing "piercing the veil," making the two essentially interchange-
able terms.12
Under the "alter ego" variant of "piercing the veil," the corporate
entity is disregarded where the separateness of the corporate entity had
ceased and restricting liability to the entity would result in injus-
tice."2 The instrumentality doctrine employs three factors: (1) exces-
sive control of the subsidiary or controlled corporation destroying its
separate existence; (2) use of such control to accomplish a fraud or
wrong or violate a statutory or legal duty; and (3) proximate cause of
injury to the plaintiff."
While the "instrumentality" doctrine and the closely associated "al-
ter ego" doctrine are stated in somewhat different formulations, they
rest essentially on the same factors. Both rest on the excessive exercise
of "control" by the dominant parent or shareholder over the subservient
subsidiary or controlled corporation and the existence of fraud or con-
duct that is "morally culpable," "fundamentally unjust" or "inequitable."
In all jurisdictions, excessive exercise of "control" and "fraud or inequi-
ty" lead to disregard of the corporate entity and imposition of the re-
sponsibilities of a subsidiary or other controlled corporation on its par-
ent corporation or controlling shareholder. Liability is imposed in par-
ticular when "control" and "fraud or inequity" are accompanied by a
125. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272 n.3.
126. See Win. Passalacqua Builders., Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138
(2d Cir. 1991); Bendix Home Sys., Inc. v. Hurston Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d 1039, 1041 (5th Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (Florida law) ("no material difference").
Connecticut employs a third variation, the so-called "identity" doctrine. Although expressed
in somewhat different terms, it utilizes substantially the same factors. See Angelo Tomasso, Inc.
v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406 (Conn. 1982) (Borden, J., dissenting); Zaist v.
Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn. 1967).
127. See Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.V.2d 270 (1987).
128. See Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R., 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (Ist Dep't). tffd, 6 N.E.2d
56 (1936).
1996]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
disregard of corporate formalities and failure to maintain corporate sep-
arateness.1
29
The dominance of traditional entity law reinforced by the rigorous
traditional requirements for "piercing the veil" is particularly notable in
such areas as contract law, in which enforcing a party's expectations
plays a major role, or in property law, where stability of a long-term
relationship is a paramount concern. But, there are other classes of
common-law controversies between private parties in which enterprise
principles have achieved greater success. While most tort cases follow
the older doctrines of entity law, with each related corporation in an
integrated group liable only for its own acts, an impressive number of
tort cases have imposed intra-enterprise liability on the parent corpora-
tion for the subsidiary's torts. 30
This increasing imposition of intra-enterprise liability in tort cases
has been accomplished by courts that have used significantly relaxed
versions of "piercing the veil," although in form they have purported to
apply traditional doctrines. As noted previously, this very technique has
been followed frequently in cases involving the construction of statutes
of general application. However, in contrast to the tort decisions, the
courts construing such statutes typically have recognized their modifica-
tion of the traditional doctrine. They have justified their relaxation of
traditional requirements because the implementation of governmental
policies and objectives were involved, rather than private controver-
sies.' 3 '
In some tort cases, enterprise concepts have been invoked expressly.
This is particularly true in litigation involving catastrophic torts where
the courts appeared to be particularly aware of the public pressures for
imposing group liability.
Three dramatic American cases involving events of this nature are
the Amoco Cadiz Oil Spill in the English Channel, 32 the Bhopal Di-
129. See BLUMBERG, LCG-In, supra note 6, at ch. 6.
130. In BLUMBERG, LCG-III, supra note 6, at ch. 10, the author has collected scores of cases
imposing intra-enterprise tort liability. However, even more cases continue to reject such liabili-
ty.
131. See Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981); Capital Tel. Co.
v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d 710,
717 (7th Cir. 1965); SEC v. Elmas Trading Corp., 620 F. Supp. 231, 234 (D. Nev. 1985);
United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (N.D. Ohio 1981);
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610, 620-21 (D. Me.
1977), affd sub nom., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. T.P. Property Corp., 583 F.2d 33
(1st Cir. 1978).
132. In re Oil Spill by the "Amoco Cadiz" off the Coast of France on Mar. 16, 1978, 1984
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saster in India, and the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William
Sound.13 In these much publicized cases, it appeared that both the
courts and the parent corporations were ready to impose or accept lia-
bility for the acts of the subsidiaries because of the intense public con-
cern over the high human and environmental costs created by the cata-
strophic disasters.
The Amoco Cadiz case involved a tanker discharge of oil in the
English Channel that befouled the sea and beaches on French, Belgian,
and Dutch coasts. Though the trial found the parent company directly
liable for its own negligence, the district court, in an alternative hold-
ing, imposed liability on the parent of the group in reliance on enter-
prise principles. It held: "As an integrated multinational corporation
which is engaged through a system of subsidiaries in the exploration,
production, refining, transportation and sale of petroleum products
throughout the world, Standard [the parent] is responsible for the tor-
tious acts of its wholly owned subsidiaries and instrumentalities [direct-
ly involved in the oil spill]."'35
In the Bhopal case, the Government of India's complaint based one
of its six causes of action on enterprise principles. 3 The American
decisions in this litigation turned on procedure and forum non conveni-
ens and never reached the substantive issue. However, in referring the
case to the Indian courts, the court conditioned the referral on an
agreement by the American parent corporation to accept the decision of
the Indian courts with respect to its own liability.' The Indian courts
A.M.C. 2123 (N.D. I. 1984) (finding No. 43), aff d, 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
133. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal in Dec. 1984. 634 F. Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), afftd and modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
134. In re the Exxon Valdez, 1995 A.M.C. 1429 (D. Alaska 1994).
135. Amoco Cadiz, 1984 A.M.C. 2123 (finding No. 43). The judgment was ultimately upheld
on appeal. 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
136. Count I, entitled "Multinational Enterprise Liability," alleged, among other things:
The complex corporate structure of the multinational with networks of subsidiaries and
divisions, makes it exceedingly difficult or even impossible to pinpoint responsibility
for the damage caused by the enterprise to discrete corporate units or individuals. In
reality, there is but one entity, the monolithic multinational .... A multinational
corporation has a primary, absolute and non-delegable duty to the persons and country
in which it has in any manner caused to be undertaken any ultrahazardous or inher-
ently dangerous activity.
Plaintiff's Complaint, Union of India v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2696 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), subsequently decided sub. nom. Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. 842, aff d and modified. 809 F.2d
195.
137. Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. 842, aftd and modified, 809 F.2d 195.
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found the parent liable, and in the settlement of the litigation,' the
American parent paid the overwhelming part of the damages.
The Exxon Valdez environmental disaster resulted from the negli-
gence of a tanker subsidiary of an integrated international oil company.
With public indignation at a very high level, Exxon, the parent corpo-
ration, was concerned with the impact of the catastrophe on consumer
attitudes. Accordingly, the parent corporation did not choose to contest
its liability for the negligence of its subsidiary.
Enterprise principles also have been used widely in tort cases aris-
ing in the taxicab industry. Where a corporate group in the taxicab in-
dustry operates taxicabs owned by a number of subsidiaries or sister
corporations as an integrated fleet with a common public persona, typi-
cally involving common logos, trade names, and color schemes, sup-
ported by common garage, maintenance, dispatching and other facilities,
the parent or sister corporations have been held liable for the tort liabil-
ity arising from any one of the taxicabs. 3 9
Finally, enterprise principles also were employed to widen the range
of liability in the early days of product liability. Before the full flower-
ing of the product liability doctrine, the presence of related corpora-
tions, such as parent and subsidiary, in different stages of the product
development-production-distribution-retail sale chain of commerce, was
used by courts to justify the imposition of liability upon an affiliate that
otherwise would have escaped liability under then-accepted doctrines
requiring direct participation in the tort."4 With the final triumph of
enterprise liability generally in product liability law and the imposition
of liability on all parties involved at any stage in commerce involving
138. Charan Lal Sahu v. Union Carbide, [1989] 1 S.C.C. 674; 2 S.C.C. 540; 3 S.C.C. 38;
Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, AIR, [1990] 1 S.C.C.273.
139. Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (New York law); Robinson v. Chase
Maintenance Corp., 190 N.Y.S.2d 773 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys.,
Inc., 284 N.Y.S. 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935), affd per curiam, 286 N.Y.S. 666 (N.Y. App. Div.
1936). See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). The latter case has received
much attention for its refusal on the pleadings before it to apply "piercing the veil jurispru-
dence" and hold the individual controlling shareholder liable for the tort liability of the con-
trolled corporation operating the taxicab. However, in so doing, the court pointedly made it
clear that the sister corporations would be liable:
[I]t is one thing to assert that a corporation is a fragment of a larger corporate com-
bine which actually conducts the business. It is quite another to claim that the corpo-
ration is a "dummy" for its individual stockholders who are in reality carrying on the
business in their personal capacities for purely personal rather than corporate ends.
Walkovszky, 223 N.E.2d at 8. See BLUMBERG, LCG-III, supra note 6, § 12.02.
140. E.g., Bathory v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 306 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1962) (Michigan
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dangerously defective products, 4 ' the ready availability of liability un-
der the newer tort law doctrine made further reliance on corporate
enterprise principles unnecessary.
2. State doctrines
In some states such as Louisiana and North Carolina, courts have
developed their own unique doctrines of enterprise law without refer-
ence to traditional "piercing the veil" jurisprudence. For instance, in
litigation involving the scope of the administrative powers of its Insur-
ance Commissioner in the rehabilitation of an insurance component of a
corporate group, the Louisiana court upheld administrative authority
over the entire group and utilization of the assets of non-insurance
company affiliates as assets of the insurance affiliate.'4 The court re-
lied on the fact that a "single business enterprise" was involved. The
court found that the group constituted a "single economic entity despite
internal compartmentalization" and that "excessive fragmentation of a
single enterprise into different corporations" had occurred.' 43
The "single business enterprise" doctrine has not been confined to
construction of the insurance statute. It has been applied in Louisiana
cases involving common law controversies as well.' 44 Similarly, in iso-
lated tort decisions, the North Carolina courts have used a "single busi-
ness enterprise" doctrine as the basis for the imposition of intra-enter-
141. RESTAMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); RESTATEMIENT (TIU,) OF TORTS ch.
1 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
142. Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (The companies con
stituted a "single business enterprise" and a "single economic entity despite the internal
compartmentalization" or "fragmentation" by separate incorporation.).
143. Green, 577 So. 2d at 259.
144. Pine Tree Assocs. v. Doctors' Assocs., Inc., 654 So. 2d 735 (La. CL App. 1995) (con-
tract); Brown v. Automotive Casualty Ins. Co., 644 So. 2d 723 (La. CL App. 1994) (insurance
rehabilitation). In Pine Tree Assocs., the court, quoting Green v. Champion Ins. Co. among oth-
ers, stated:
Where two or more corporations operate a single business, the courts have been un-
willing to allow affiliated corporations that are not directly involved to escape liability
simply because of the business fragmentation. In addition to using a "piercing the
veil" theory to disregard a corporate identity, the "single business enterprise" or "in-
strumentality" theory has been used to extend liability beyond a separate entity.
654 So. 2d at 738 (quoting Green, 577 So. 2d at 257) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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prise liability. 45 Whether these decisions, however, mean a permanent
change in Louisiana and North Carolina tort law is far from clear.
3. Judicial Procedure
In some areas of American procedural law, enterprise principles
have made marked inroads. These include such areas as jurisdiction,
claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel),
pre-trial discovery, and some aspects of the application of statutes of
limitation. In these areas involving procedural matters rather than issues
of substantive liability, the sharply reduced role of limited liability con-
tributes to a more ready abandonment of established concepts of the
separate juridical existence of each affiliated corporation.
a. Jurisdiction
In recent decades, American constitutional standards for the asser-
tion of judicial in personam jurisdiction have moved from older con-
cepts of "presence" and "doing business" to an evaluation of the exis-
tence of "minimum contacts" according to the standards of the Interna-
tional Shoe decision and its progeny.'" Under the influence of this
change, the courts have divided increasingly on the circumstances under
which jurisdiction may be asserted over a foreign affiliate in reliance on
the activities of a local affiliate with which it is conducting a common
business under common control. While many American courts still
adhere to the older view in which the forms of separate corporate exis-
tence are decisive, 47 a significant number of courts have relied on en-
terprise principles to uphold the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign
parents (and subsidiaries) of domestic subsidiary (or parent) corpora-
145. Glenn v. Wagner, 313 S.E.2d 832, 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
329 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1985). The intermediate appellate court stated: "lhe extension of liability
for a corporation's obligations beyond the confines of its own separate corporate entity is appro-
priate in those cases where an essentially single business or economic enterprise is nevertheless
conducted through several separate corporations. ... The court described this as the "'single
enterprise' theory of inter-corporate liability."
146. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945). Subsequent decisions
have engrafted additional requirements such as the party's "purposeful[] avail[ment]" and "sub-
stantial connection" with the benefits of the forum, its reasonable anticipation of being hailed
into litigation in the courts of the forum and whether the assertion offends concepts of "fair
play and substantial justice." E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
292, 297 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252-53 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
147. E.g., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
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tions. 4 A powerful force strengthening this development has been the
development of the "stream of commerce" doctrinel49 in which jurisdic-
tional concepts have been expanded, particularly where foreign-based
multinationals are involved. This doctrinal expansion matches the ex-
panded "enterprise liability" content of modem product liability law.
While this movement originated in product liability litigation, courts
have extended it to other matters, including patent infringement and
contracts."5°
b. Claim and Issue Preclusion
Enterprise principles prevail in both claim preclusion (res judica-
ta)"5  and in issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). 52  American
courts have extended claim preclusion to bind affiliated corporations of
a party as well as the party itself. Thus, a parent (or a subsidiary) is
bound by a prior adverse judgment on the same claim involving the
same defense in a prior action brought by its subsidiary (or parent).
Similarly, a parent (or subsidiary) is protected by a prior favorable
judgment for its subsidiary (or parent) in a prior action on the same
claim involving the same defense brought by the same plaintiff.
In the same manner, the doctrine of issue preclusion has been ap-
plied to the members of corporate groups. Where an issue has been lit-
igated and determined in a prior action involving its parent (or subsid-
iary) corporation the subsidiary (or parent) corporation is bound by the
finding of the issue in the prior action. 3
The courts have applied the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion to members of corporate groups in keeping with the broader
doctrine that applies such doctrines of preclusion to all non-parties
whose interests in and relationship to the litigation are so closely relat-
148. See BLUMBERG, LCG-I, supra note 6. at chs. 3-5.
149. Under the "stream of commerce" doctrine, courts have asserted jurisdiction over foreign
parent corporations of American subsidiaries or distributors where a substantial volume of the
parent's products were distributed to the jurisdiction and the parent could have reasonably antic-
ipated that claims would ensure. See BLUMBERO, LCG-I. supra note 6. § 5.12a (Supp. 1995).
150. See BLUMBERG, LCG-I, supra note 6, § 3.08 and §§ 5.12a-5.12b (Supp. 1995).
151. A final judgment on the merits by a court with jurisdiction binds the parties with respect
to the cause of action or any defense thereto; this is res judicata or claim preclusion.
152. Issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) applies when an issue of law or fact has been
litigated and determined in an action between the parties and the determination was essential to
the final judgment. In such event, the parties are bound by the determination in subsequent liti-
gation of any kind.
153. See BLuMBERG, LCG-I, supra note 6, §§ 11.02-11.03.
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ed to a party as to make it appropriate to extend the finality of the
judgment to them. This is intended to serve judicial efficiency as well
as fairness because under these circumstances, one may conclude fairly
that the corporate affiliates functioning under common control and the
other closely related parties have already had their "day in court."' 4
c. Pre-Trial Discovery
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties may achieve
pre-trial discovery through interrogatories of "such information as is
available"'55 and the production of documents in the "possession, cus-
tody, or control" of another party.'56 These provisions have been con-
strued expansively to authorize discovery on a group-wide basis, includ-
ing not only parties to the litigation but all corporations in the corpo-
rate group of which the party is a member. "[P]ossession, custody, or
control" of a subsidiary has been construed to include documents of its
parent and sister corporations as well.' 57
In multinational enterprises, this construction has led to extraterrito-
rial assertion of American judicial power over foreign corporations,
leading to serious international confrontation. In consequence, no less
than 15 countries adopted so-called blocking statutes restricting the re-
lease of documents pursuant to an order from a court or agency in an-
other country and forbidding compliance with American judicial discov-
ery orders. 58
The United States has joined with the European powers to eliminate
or reduce such disputes. With respect to litigation generally, the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters"' and in the antitrust area in particular, agreements with the
European Union, Australia, Canada, and Germany have sharply reduced
the areas of controversy.16°
154. See 18 CHARLEs A WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
AND RELATED MATTERS § 4460 (1981).
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1).
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a), 34(a)(1). Canadian law is much the same. Canadian Rules of Civ-
il Procedure, Rule 30.02.4. Can. 0. Reg. 560184.
158. E.g., British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 1980 Stats. 8(5), at 313, §§ 2, 4;
French Law of July 16, 1980, Law No. 80-538, 1980 J.O. 1799; Canadian Combined Investiga-
tion Act, Rev. Stat. Can. ch. C-23, § 31.5. See BLUMBERG, LCG-I, supra note 6, § 10.10.
159. Convention for the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened
for signature, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241, (text reprinted at 28
U.S.C.A. § 1781 (Supp. 1995)).
160. Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., 30
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d. Statutes of Limitation
Where a plaintiff mistakenly has begun an action against a parent
(or subsidiary) corporation of a corporate group within the statutory
period for filing such actions and then, after the expiration of the peri-
od, seeks to add or substitute the subsidiary (or parent or sister subsid-
iary), the courts have construed Federal Rule 15(c) to permit such an
action. This is possible only where the other party had received notice
of the action during the statutory period and knew or should have
known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the party, the
action would have been brought against it."" The courts support this
application of enterprise law by emphasizing that the affiliated parties
have identical interests, their close interrelationship, and the reasonable
assurance that notice to one constituent company would be brought to
the attention of the other. 62
4. Corporate Procedure
In three procedural areas pertaining to corporations-multiple deriv-
ative actions, inspection of books and records of subsidiaries, and vot-
ing of parent stock held by subsidiaries-American courts have departed
from entity law to apply enterprise principles.
a. Multiple Derivative Actions
The American derivative action authorizes a shareholder of a corpo-
ration, upon notice and demand to the corporation, to institute an action
in the name of, on behalf of, and for the benefit of the corporation,
either against a third party or against corporate officers or directors.' 3
Under the multiple derivative action doctrine, the derivative remedy has
IL.M. 1487 (1991). After the European Court held that the agreement negotiated by the Euro-
pean Commission was beyond its power, France v. European Commission (Case C-327191 1994),
the European Union approved it. Common Ikt. Rep. (CCH). EC Update No. 58, Apr. 27,
1995, at 1. See also Agreement Relating to Cooperation in Anti-Trust Matters, June 29, 1982,
U.S.-Austrl., 34 U.S.T. 389, 21 LL.M. 702 (1982); Memorandum With Respect to the Applica-
tion of National Anti-Trust Laws, March 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., 23 LL.M. 275 (1984); Agreement
Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-
F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956, 1039 U.N.T.S. 345 (1976).
161. FED. R. CrV. P. 15(c). See BLUMBERG, LCG-l. supra note 6, at ch. 12.
162. See, e.g., Lockett v. General Fin. Loan Co., 623 F.2d 1128. 1131 (5th Cir. 1980);
Horwitt v. Longines Wittauer Watch Co., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1257, 1258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
163. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUtE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVE tANCE- ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01 (1994); 13 Wiu.A1W MEADE FLETCER0, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5977 (rev. penn. ed. 1991).
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been broadened to authorize a derivative action by a shareholder of a
parent corporation in the name and on behalf of a subsidiary corpora-
tion (or even a second-tier subsidiary corporation), although the share-
holder of the parent corporation does not hold directly any shares in the
subsidiary.' 64 This includes majority-owned and sister subsidiaries as
well as wholly owned subsidiaries.' 65 Apparently, no American court
has considered this question with respect to minority-owned controlled
subsidiaries of a corporate group, although the result should be the
same. This is particularly true in the case of an action against the par-
ent or its officers or directors for alleged breach of fiduciary duty
where the parent board of directors may not be expected to act.
b. Inspection of Books and Records
Under American common law and statutory law, a shareholder has
the right to inspect the stock ledger book and other books and records
of a corporation in which it holds shares provided that it is doing so
for a "proper purpose."'" Although there is surprisingly little authori-
ty on the matter, the cases considering this issue have divided over wheth-
er a shareholder's right of inspection includes the books and records of
subsidiary corporations as well.' 67 Since access to the information con-
cerning subsidiaries is directly related to the rationale for recognition of
164. E.g., Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649, affid on reh'g, 169 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1948);
Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); United
States Lines, Inc. v. United States Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1938); Kaufman v. Wolfson,
151 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956). See BLUMBERG, LCG-I, supra note 6, at ch. 16;
AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 165, § 7.02,
cmt. f.
165. United States Lines, 96 F.2d 148; Kaufman, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
166. See 5A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 2213-2215 (rev. penn. ed. 1995); 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 16.02 (Supp.
1995). A "proper purpose" is the existence of a reasonable relationship to one's interest as a
shareholder.
167. Some courts have recognized the right of inspection in the intragroup context. E.g., Sack
v. Cadence Indus., C.A. No. 4747 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 1975), 4 Del. J. Corp. L. 223 (1978);
Leeds v. G. Fried & Sons, 117 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952), rev'd on other grounds,
119 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953). Most examine the problem by reference to "piercing
the veil jurisprudence." See BLUMBERG, LCG-I, supra note 6, §§ 18.02-18.03.
While providing that every director of the parent corporation has the right to inspect the
books of subsidiary corporations, the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance: Analysis and Recommendations does not discuss whether the shareholders of the parent
have a right to do so. AMERICAN LAW INSTTrUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 165, § 3.03(a) and Reporter's Note 5. The Model Business Corporation Act similarly
does not address the problem. 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN., § 16.02 (Supp. 1995).
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the basic right of inspection, the better view would uphold inspection.
A California statute so provides.'6
c. Voting of Parent Stock Held By Subsidiaries
In cases where a subsidiary corporation owns shares of its parent
corporation, American statutes and judicial decisions have held uniform-
ly that the subsidiary is barred from voting such shares in the election
of directors of the parent corporation. " This sound policy rests on
the undesirability of permitting the members of the board of directors
of the parent, who have the power to command the manner of voting
of such shares by a subsidiary, from using such votes for their own re-
election or the election of their designees.
This doctrine has been applied in cases involving shares held by
subsidiaries that were at least majority-owned. It should also apply to
shares held by any controlled corporation, even where minority-owned.
Notwithstanding the reduced stock interest of the parent corporation,
where it has "control" of the subsidiary, it retains the power to direct
the voting of the shares. The evil giving rise to the doctrine is equally
prevalent in minority-owed subsidiaries as it is in majority-owned sub-
sidiaries. "Control," however achieved, and the existence of the under-
lying evil, should be recognized as the crucial factors that bring the
underlying policy into play.170
III. INTERNATIONAL ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLCING NATIONAL
LAW USING EXTRATERRTORIAL ENTERPRISE PRINCIPLES
This is an era of national law and world business. Multinational
enterprises, consisting of parent and subsidiary corporations incorporated
under and governed by the national laws of numerous nation-states,
168. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1601(a) (West 1977). See BIuMBERO. LCG.I, supra note 6, §
18.06.
169. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 7.21(b) (Supp. 1995). See BLmBERO, LCG-I, supra
note 6, at ch. 19. Although the American jurisdictions are substantially divided over the issue of
voting parent shares held by a subsidiary in a fiduciary capacity, the Model Act provides such
shares may be voted. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.21(c) (Supp. 1995).
170. While the provision in the Model Act is limited to majority-owned subsidiaries, the Offi-
cial Comment recognizes that the purpose of "[t]he prohibition to prevent management from
using corporate investment to perpetuate itself in power[]" is also present when the parent owns
a "large but not majority interest," that is, controls the subsidiary. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 7.21 cmlt. 3 (Supp. 1995).
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dominate the world economy. Thus, the use of enterprise principles to
bring a multinational group, with its many foreign constituent compa-
nies, under the national regulatory program of the parent corporation,
inevitably sets the stage for international confrontation and controversy.
As the national legal systems of the great industrial powers increasingly
use enterprise principles to deal with the problems presented by corpo-
rate groups in order to achieve more effective implementation of their
domestic regulatory programs, the pressure has increased severely for
international efforts to deal with the resulting conflict. This is the inter-
national dimension of the law of corporate groups.
Recognizing this problem, the United States and a number of Euro-
pean nation-states, as well as the European Union itself, have joined on
a number of occasions to achieve improved international accommoda-
tion of the overlapping national regulatory programs. There have been a
number of encouraging developments of this nature. These include the
proliferation of bilateral tax treaties and of international efforts for har-
monization of national tax laws,' international agreements on coordi-
nation and cooperation of the enforcement of antitrust laws between the
United States and England, Germany, and now the European Union, 72
and the growing application of the provisions of the Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters. 73 The statutory exclusions in the American employment discrim-
ination laws to avoid conflict with foreign law represent a further uni-
lateral step in the same direction. 74
171. For tax treaties, see Fed. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 1M 2690 (France, 1968, amended 1979, 1983,
1988); 2695 (Germany, 1990); 2725 (Italy, 1985); 2850 (United Kingdom, 1980). See also Ste-
phen G. Utz, Tax Harmonization and Coordination in Europe and America, 9 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 767 (1994).
172. Agreement on the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., 30
I.L.M. 1487 (1991). After the European Court held that the agreement negotiated by the Euro-
pean Commission was beyond its power, France v. EC Commission (Case C-327/91 (1994)), the
European Union Parliament and Council approved it. Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH), EC Update
No. 58, Apr. 27, 1995, at 1. See also 23 I.L.M. 275 (Can., 1984); 21 I.L.M. 702 (AustI.,
1982); 15 I.L.M. 1282 (F.R.G., 1976).
173. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened
for signature, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241, (text reprinted at 28
U.S.C.A. § 1781 (1995)). In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987), the Supreme Court held that use of the Hague Convention by
United States courts was not mandatory. However, the courts should use "special vigilance" to
prevent foreign litigants from abuse and to demonstrate due respect for any sovereign interest
expressed by another nation. Four concurring judges contended that "there should be a general
presumption favoring use of the Convention" rather than the Federal Rules unless the Conven-
tion proved futile or unhelpful. Id. at 568 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
174. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (1995); Title VII of the
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The application of national law to problems of world business inev-
itably results in international controversy and confrontation. As statutory
programs are extended to the extraterritorial operations of American
corporate groups, including their foreign subsidiaries, these problems
become more and more serious. The task of finding accommodation for
the clash of national regulatory programs is a fundamental problem for
the international order. 75
IV. ENTERPRISE PRINCIPLES AS A FORM OF RELATIONAL LAW
Any discussion of American corporate groups would not be com-
plete without recognizing that the application of enterprise principles for
the attribution of rights and liabilities between parent and subsidiary
corporations is only a sub-set of the larger legal problem of attributing
rights and liabilities among the participants in collective commercial
undertakings generally. Similarly, it is not recognized that these devel-
opments represent what Dean Roscoe Pound a century ago termed "re-
lational law," the determination of legal rights and responsibilities by
reference to status, not contract.
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The application of enterprise doctrines to commercial undertakings
occurs in response to the presence of three fundamental factors: eco-
nomic integration, "control," and interdependence of the participating
interests. Whether or not linked by stock or by contract, when parties
join in the collective conduct of an integrated economic activity, much
the same pressures for application of enterprise principles are present.
These pressures are strengthened when the contract establishes a rela-
tionship of dominance and subservience and when the subservient party
is one of a number under the control of the dominant party conducting
different fragments of a common business. Where the contract requires
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et. seq. (1995). These provisions exclude com-
pliance with the acts if it would "violate the laws of the country in which [the] workplace is
located. "[L]aws of the country" has been construed to include collective bargaining agreements.
Mahoney v. RFEIRL Inc., 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
175. See PHiLup L BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE
SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993); Phillip I. Blumberg. National Law and
Transnational Groups and Transactions: Survey of the American Experience. 5 AUsM J. CORP.
L 295 (1995) (presented in December 1994 in Brisbane, Australia at the First Annual Asia-Pa-
cific Economic Law Forum).
176. 1 ROsCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 210-21 (1959); ROsCOE POUND, THE SPirr OF THE
COMMON LAW 12-29 (1921).
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the subservient party's conduct of the collective business under the
trade name, logo, and other indicia of the public persona of the domi-
nant party, the parallel to the corporate group linked by stock is even
more apparent.
Franchisors and franchisees which today represent a major segment
of the American economy" most strongly raise the issue of the appli-
cation of enterprise principles to collective undertakings resting on con-
tract. Other examples include licensors and licensees, and contractors
and subcontractors or others in an integrated contractual chain.
These examples of the application of enterprise principles to com-
mercial undertakings do not stand alone. There are numerous develop-
ments in American law that involve comparable application of enter-
prise principles and the growing expansion of relational law - or law
flowing from status (or relationship) rather than contract - in modem
commercial affairs. In addition to corporate groups linked by stock
ownership and those linked by contract, American law includes such
dynamically developing areas of enterprise law as lender liability and
successor liability in corporation law, enterprise liability in product lia-
bility law, and comparable developments emerging in American health
law.
This acceptance of relational principles in major areas of the mod-
em economy has close parallels in earlier common law developments in
related areas that often did not involve large-scale business operations.
An outstanding example is the venerable doctrine of respondeat superi-
or in the attribution of tort liability from servant to master.'78 Another
example has been the acceptance of the doctrine of inherent agen-
cy.179  This phenomenon, almost entirely ignored in the litera-
ture, 18  cannot be discussed adequately here due to the restricted
177. In 1991 542,500 American franchised operations generated annual sales of about $750
billion. Auto and truck dealers and gasoline service centers accounted for about 25 percent of
these franchised establishments and represented as much as 66 percent of aggregate sales. The
others largely consisted of restaurants, hotels, food retailers, and service companies of various
kinds. Stat. Abstr. of the U.S. tab. 1314 (1993).
178. See 5 FOWLER HAR"ER Er AL., LAW OF TORTS ch. 26 (2d ed. 1986).
179. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1958). See WARREN A. SEAvEY, HANDBOOK
OF AGENCY § 8F (1964).
180. For exceptions, see Hugh Collins, The Transformation Thesis and the Ascription of Con-
tractual Responsibility, in PERSPECnVES OF CRITICAL CONTRACT LAW 293-310 (T. Wilhelmsson
ed., 1993); Gunther Teubner, Piercing the Contractual Veil? The Social Responsibility of Con-
tractual Networks, in PERSPECTIVS OF CRITICAL CONTRACT LAW 211-40 (T. Wilhelmsson ed.,
1993); Gunther Teubner, Beyond Contract and Organization? The External Liability of Fran-
chising Systems in German Law, in FRANCHISING AND THE LAW: THEORETICAL AND COMPARA-
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scope of this paper. It will, however, be the subject of the seventh and
concluding volume of the author's series entitled The Law of Corporate
Groups.
V. CONCLUSION
In the last half century, the acceptance of enterprise principles in
American law, primarily on the statutory and administrative level, but
also in judicial decisions, has become a more prominent feature of the
law governing commercial and financial activity. American law in this
area cannot be understood properly without a clear recognition of this
development.
American law presents a paradox. Of all the countries in the world,
it has experienced the most prominent growth of the application of en-
terprise law to corporate groups. This is particularly true in the statu-
tory area as evidenced by the existence of pervasive regulatory pro-
grams dealing with banking, savings and loan, insurance, and public
utility holding companies as well as statutes more selectively applying
enterprise principles to securities, labor, anti-discrimination, employee
pensions statutes, and foreign trade and investment. Moreover, this
growth also has occurred in numerous areas of judicial lawmaking in-
volving private controversies at common law, particularly torts, as well
as in judicial procedure and corporate procedure.
At the same time, the jurisprudential significance of this major de-
velopment in the American legal system has still not been recognized
widely. The American bench and American commentators still most
often approach the problem as primarily one of corporate law to be
determined by traditional entity law and "piercing the veil" jurispru-
dence.'81 In contrast, European and Australian legal literature on the
legal problems of corporate groups is voluminous."
TIVE APPROACHES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 105-32 (C. Joerges ed. 1991); Hugh
Collins, Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex Patterns of Economic Interac-
tion, 53 MOD. L. REv. 731 (1990).
181. The author's treatise, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 6, and his MULTNA-
TIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW, supra note 174, virtally constitute the only exten-
sive consideration of the development.
182. See, e.g., J. Antunes, Liability of Corporate Groups, in 10 STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAI. ECO-
NOMIC LAW (N. Horn & R. Buxbaum eds., 1994); KoNZERNRECorr im AUSLAND (M. Lutter ed.,
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GAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISLS (Klaus J. Hopt ed.. 1982);
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Nor has the true jurisprudential nature of the development been
adequately recognized. Enterprise law is relational law. The attribution
of legal rights and responsibilities from one related party to another
with whom it is collectively conducting a common business under com-
mon control rests on status not contract. This is a development of his-
toric proportions. Sir Henry Maine's dictum that the history of the Eng-
lish law is best understood as the movement from status to contract
83
is part of the educational inheritance of every American and English
lawyer. However, in commercial areas, the reality is quite different. The
movement of American law is from contract to status.
Multinational corporations and other corporate groups present major
problems for all nation-states in which they conduct business. As dis-
cussed above, these underlying problems have given rise to extensive
application of enterprise principles in the national systems of regulatory
law involving major industries, tax law, and the adjudication of contro-
versies in the national courts.
In this century, large corporations have become even larger, have
burst their national boundaries, and in all countries, conduct themselves
as multinational corporations doing business the world over. Multina-
tionals increasingly dominate in the new global economy. The applica-
tion of national law to world business resting on the extraterritorial im-
position of enterprise principles to foreign subsidiaries of multinational
parent corporations leads to inevitable confrontation with foreign nations
that are pursuing differing policies and objectives. In the world global
market, enterprise principles have made national legal systems inade-
quate. Nor do contemporary concepts of international law provide a
solution. The need to fashion an international legal order that can re-
spond adequately to the problems so presented is becoming more ur-
gent.
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